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MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW 
Vol. 62 MAY 1964 No. 7 
MANAGEMENT AND LABOR APPRAISALS AND 
CRITICISMS OF THE ARBITRATION PROCESS: 
A REPORT WITH COMMENTS 
Dallas L. Jones* and Russell A. Smith** 
ALTHOUGH arbitration as a means of resolving disputes arising under collective bargaining agreements has received wide-
spread acceptance in this country/ in recent years there has been 
some evidence of increasing criticism of the process.2 As part of 
a research project dealing with the impact of the 1960 Supreme 
Court decisions in the Warrior & Gulf "trilogy"8 and the 1962 
• Professor of Industrial Relations, Graduate School of Business Administration, The 
University of Michigan.-Ed . 
.. Professor of Law, The University of Michigan; President-elect, National Academy 
of Arbitrators.-Ed. 
1 Professor R. W. Fleming in his paper, The Labor Arbitration Process: 1943-1963, 
given in January 1964, at the 17th Annual Meeting of the National Academy of Arbitra• 
tors reported: "I am told that an as yet unpublished study by the BLS will show that in 
1961-1962 approximately 94 per cent of the agreements examined [presumably in the 
BLS files] contained grievance arbitration clauses." 
2 See generally Aaron, Labor Arbitration and Its Critics, 10 LAB. L.J. 605 (1959); Fer• 
guson, An Appraisal of Labor Arbitration-A Management Viewpoint, 8 IND. &: LAB. REL. 
REv. 79 (1954-55); Iserman, The Arbitrator in Grievance Procedures: Is Arbitration the 
Way To Settle Labor Disputes?, 35 A.B.A.J. 987 (1949); Katz, Challengeable Trends in 
Labor Arbitration, 7 ARB. J. (n.s.) 12 (1952); Manson, Is Arbitration Expendable?, N.Y.U. 
12TH ANN. CONFERENCE ON LAB. 1 (1959); Murphy, Arbitration: Evaluation of Its Role in 
Labor Relations, N.Y.U. 12TII ANN. CONFERENCE ON LAB. 281 (1959); Platt, Current Criti• 
cisms of Labor Arbitration, ARBITRATION AND THE LAw vii (BNA 1959). 
8 United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960); United Steelworkers 
v. Warrior &: Gulf Nav. Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); and United Steelworkers v. Enterprise 
Wheel &: Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960). For the results of a preliminary survey on the 
impacts of these decisions, see Smith, Arbitrability-The Arbitrator, the Courts and the 
Parties, 17 ARB. J. (n.s.) 3 (1962), which is an abridgment of Smith, The Question of "Ar-
bitrability"-The Roles of the Arbitrator, the Court, and the Parties, 16 Sw. L.J. I 
(1962). Sec also Aaron, Arbitration in the Federal Courts: Aftermath of the Trilogy, 9 
U.C.L.A.L. REv. 360 (1962). 
Other discussions of the "Trilogy" include Davey, The Supreme Court and Arbitration: 
The Musings of an Arbitrator, 36 NoTRE DAME LAw. 138 (1961); Gregory, Enforcement 
of Collective Agreements by Arbitration, 48 VA. L. REv. 883 (1962); Hays, The Supreme 
Court and Labor Law-October Term, 1959, 60 CoLUM. L. REv. 901 (1960); Levitt, The 
Supreme Court and Arbitration, N.Y.U. 14TII ANN. CONFERENCE ON LAB. 217 (1961); Meltzer, 
The Supreme Court, Arbitrability, and Collective Bargaining, 28 U. CHI. L. REv. 464 
(1961); Wallen, Recent Supreme Court Decisions on Arbitration: An Arbitrator's View, 
63 W. VA. L. REv. 295 (1961); Wellington, Judicial Review of the Promise To Arbitrate, 
37 N.Y.U.L. REv. 471 (1962); Symposium-Arbitration and the Courts, 58 Nw. U.L. REv. 
466, 494, 521, 556 (1963). 
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Sinclair "trilogy,"4 we decided to ascertain how parties are ap-
praising the arbitration process. We report here the more signifi-
cant results of this survey along with our evaluation of the criti-
cisms and suggestions which were received.IS 
The two questions asked which evoked the responses upon 
which this article is based were: 
(I) Are you generally satisfied with the arbitration process, or, 
given a choice, would you prefer leaving all issues of con-
tract application to the courts, or to collective bargaining 
(including strike action)? 
(2) What suggestions do you have for improving the arbitra-
tion process? 
A. SUMMARY OF OPINIONS 
By an overwhelming majority our respondents indicate that 
they prefer the arbitration process to the available alternatives as 
a method of ultimate resolution of contract application (grievance) 
disputes. Only some five percent of our "management" respon-
4 Drake Bakeries v. Local 50, 370 U.S. 254 (1962); Atkinson v. Sinclair Ref. Co., 370 
U.S. 238 (1962); Sinclair Ref. Co. v. Atkinson, 370 U.S. 195 (1962). For discussions of 
these cases, see Aaron, Strikes in Breach of Collective Agreements: Some Unanswered 
Questions, 63 CoLUM. L. REv. 1027 (1963); Aaron, The Labor Injunction Reappraised, 
IO U.C.L.A.L. REv. 292, 337-43 (1963); Burstein, Labor Arbitration-A Management View, 
N.Y.U. 16TH .ANN. CoNFERENCE oN LAB. 297, 317-18 (1963); Dannett, Norris-LaGuardia 
and Injunctions in Labor Arbitration Cases, N.Y.U. 16TH .ANN. CONFERENCE ON LAB. 275 
(1963); Isaacson, The Grand Equation: Labor Arbitration and the No-Strike Clause, 48 
A.B.A.J. 914 (1962); Marshall, Enforcing the Labor Contract, 14 LAB. L.J. 353, 356-57 
(1963); Marshall, Section JOI-Problems and Prospects, LABOR ARllITRATION & INDUSTRIAL 
CHANGE 146, 151-55 (BNA 1963) and discussions by Frederic D. Anderson at 159-65 and 
David Previant at 172-74; Pfister, Arbitration and the Supreme Court 1962 Spring Term, 
4 Aruz. L. REv. 200 (1963); Stutz, Arbitrators and the Remedy Power, LABOR ARllITRATION 
&: INDUSTRIAL CHANGE 54, 64-67 (BNA 1963); Sullivan & Tomlin, The Supreme Court and 
Section JOI of the Labor Management Relations Act, 42 TEXAS L. REv. 214, 228-30, 239-41 
(1963); Vladeck, Injunctive Relief Against Strikes in Breach of the Labor Agreement, 
N.Y.U. 16TH .ANN. CONFERENCE ON LAB. 289 (1963); Weiss, Labor Arbitration and the 
1961-1962 Supreme Court, 51 GEo. L.J. 284 (1963); Wellington &: Albert, Statutory Inter• 
pretation and the Political Process: A Comment on Sinclair v. Atkinson, 72 YALE L.J. 
1547 (1963). 
IS A total of 715 letters of inquiry were sent to management representatives (directors 
of industrial relations and labor counsels) or to independent attorneys representing man• 
agement. There were 306 responses, 42 of which offered no assistance. Two hundred 
ninety letters were sent to union officials (international officers and general counsels) or 
to other attorneys representing unions. We received 90 responses, 13 of which offered 
no assistance. 
The study was not conceived, however, as a statistical survey. We were concerned 
more with quality than with quantity and hoped to receive the considered judgment 
of knowledgeable people in the field. Our list of potential correspondents was developed 
from various sources, including members of the National Academy of Arbitrators. The 
names thus supplied were carefully reviewed, and to them were added others in an 
attempt to obtain adequate coverage both of industry and section of the country. 
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dents (including lawyers representing management) indicate a 
preference for resort to the courts, or a preference for exclusive 
reliance on the collective bargaining process including permissive 
strike action. Not a single union official respondent prefers either 
of such methods as an alternative to arbitration. Four attorneys 
representing unions indicate a preference for the collective bar-
gaining-strike route alternative, but none prefers the route of liti-
gation. A few respondents from each side indicate that there are 
instances in which the collective bargaining process, including 
possible strike action, might be preferable for "strategic" reasons, 
but they would still select arbitration as the end process for most 
disputes. 
The reasons stated for preferring arbitration over judicial liti-
gation of contract application issues are the traditional ones-
court action is too slow, cumbersome, and expensive, as compared 
with arbitration, and arbitrators, by virtue of their "expertise," 
are better equipped than judges to decide such issues. The few 
who state a preference for the judicial process do so on various 
grounds. Some think the "traditional" views are factually incor-
rect. 6 Others make the invidious charge that arbitrators ( or at 
least some of them) lack the "courage" to make clear-cut, firm de-
cisions for fear of "losing business" and tend to "split" decisions. 
Some indicate dissatisfaction with the finality of the arbitrator's 
decision, and hence prefer the litigator's opportunity for appellate 
review. In part, those who express this view believe there is no 
effective way, as law and practice now stand, to limit the power 
of the arbitrator. 
A few respondents, principally from the management side, who 
prefer collective bargaining, including potential strike action, over 
other methods of settling contract application issues, express some 
of the same kinds of dissatisfaction with the arbitration process 
6 One respondent states: "In a court of law you are reasonably sure of what the law 
provides before you initiate a lawsuit, and your main concern is whether you can intro-
duce facts in support of your theory of law. In an arbitration proceeding you are just 
as unsure of your facts, but you are also unable to determine the law of your contract, 
and it makes little difference whether you are speaking of the general principles of arbi-
tration law or the principles followed by a particular arbitrator. I am sure we are all 
aware of the fact that several nationally known arbitrators have decided the subcontract-
ing question in separate cases on completely inconsistent theories." 
We have some disagreement with our respondent to the extent he thinks there is 
more predictability or certainty as to "the law," even of contract interpretation, in ju-
dicial than in arbitration proceedings. In our multifarious judicial system, state and 
federal, instances of irreconcilable conflict between decisions are numerous, and even the 
highest appellate tribunals, including the United States Supreme Court, often increase 
areas of uncertainty by overruling, modifying, or qualifying previously established rules. 
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noted above, as well as the traditional reasons for rejecting the 
alternative of judicial litigation. Some frankly believe that man-
agement would do better with collective bargaining because 
unions would be less disposed to strike than to arbitrate in view 
of the financial loss involved in strike action and the political dif-
ficulties of obtaining membership approval of strike action, espe-
cially in the case of grievances important only to a single individ-
ual or to a small group within the bargaining unit. On the other 
hand, some of our union respondents indicate that this is one of 
the reasons they prefer arbitration to collective bargaining or to 
judicial litigation. They believe that individual claims wouid 
often have to be disregarded, and thereby contractual rights would 
become less meaningful, if the final resolution of such claims de-
pended upon strike action or judicial litigation.7 
A substantial number of our respondents not only prefer arbi-
tration over the other available alternatives, but also indicate they 
are generally satisfied with the arbitration process as they now find 
it, and offer no suggestions for its improvement. On the other 
hand, many, although generally of the opinion that arbitration is 
the best of the viable alternatives, indicate dissatisfactions of var-
ious kinds, and hold that the process can and should be improved. 
Criticisms range rather broadly. There is a very substantial 
concern, especially on the management side, with the scope of the 
arbitrator's power. This stems in part, but only in part, from the 
Warrior & Gulf trilogy, and has evoked interest in establishing 
some kind of arbitral "review." Many of our respondents express 
the desire to see improvements in arbitration procedure, including 
methods of selecting arbitrators and a reduction in the time and 
expense involved in arbitration. Overwhelmingly, our respon-
dents who think things could be improved single out for special 
attention the arbitrator himself. They do not seem to share Mr. 
Justice Douglas's view, as expressed in the Warrior trilogy, that the 
arbitrator is possessed of extraordinarily superior talents, border-
ing on the occult, for dealing with the issues. Indeed, they would 
like to see him achieve a higher quality performance standard than 
they claim to have encountered. (Naturally, some arbitrators seem 
7 We agree that management would "gain," in a sense, by the elimination of arbi-
tration in that unions probably would be disinclined to strike over some matters that 
would ordinarily be arbitrated. Accordingly, management would not be risking an 
adverse decision. But the "gain" in particular cases might be offset by an end product 
of severe employee and union dissatisfaction with the non-resolution of grievances, which 
could increase the intensity of strike action in those cases where such action is taken. 
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to have reached the pinnacle, but they apparently are considered 
to be few in number.) 
Our general impression from the survey leads us to believe 
that arbitration is not seriously threatened, at least at this time, 
by any of its possible competitors; there is, however, a sub-
stantial amount of discontent with some aspects of the process. 
We think the criticisms and suggestions for improvement are suffi-
ciently widespread to deserve careful consideration. Not all of the 
suggestions advanced will be discussed, because some lack anything 
resembling widespread support, and others, in our judgment, are 
specious or capricious. In what follows we shall undertake a re-
view and appraisal of the suggestions made in the problem areas 
which appear to be of greatest concern or merit. 
We conclude these introductory remarks with a note on the 
lighter side. We have gained the rather distinct impression from 
our survey that the lawyers involved in labor relations, whether 
representing management or unions, tend to be more concerned 
than "laymen" (industrial relations directors and union officials) 
about the inadequacies of the arbitration process. What this sig-
nifies we would not, if we could, attempt to say, since the co-
authors are, respectively, a layman and a lawyer-more accurately, 
a labor economics professor and a law professor.8 
B. MAJOR AREAS OF CONCERN WITH THE ARBITRATION PROCESS 
I. The Arbitrator's "Power" and the Finality of His 
Decision: Should There Be "Review" Procedures? 
There is no doubt that the scope of the arbitrator's authority, 
and the legal finality of his award, are matters of some concern. 
This concern is seen especially on the management side, although 
the range and depth of feeling on these matters varies widely. There 
likewise appears to be no doubt that this apprehension, although 
of long standing, has been substantially increased in consequence 
of the Supreme Court's 1960 decisions in the Warrior & Gulf 
trilogy. These decisions have been interpreted, correctly we think, 
as having sharply reduced the opportunity to make effective use 
of the courts in either an attempt to intercept the submission of 
8 ·we also do some arbitrating, and we issue the caveat that, since we believe in the 
process and arc to some extent involved in it, our appraisals of the criticisms and sug-
gestions offered by our respondents may be colored somewhat by a bias which we 
cannot escape. On the other hand, our participation in the process may perhaps serve 
the useful purpose of giving us a perspective or basis for judgment based on a certain 
amount of experience. 
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issues to arbitration or to upset the awards which result. One 
management representative stated: 
"In general, we are satisfied with the arbitration process. 
It provides a speedy, fair, and inexpensive means to resolve 
disputes. However, we are beginning to be concerned with 
the doctrine of non-reviewability (for all practical purposes) 
of arbitration decisions. The 1960 trilogy and subsequent • 
decisions have placed upon arbitrators a degree of responsi-
bility that tends to produce chills upon appropriate body loca-
tions. When one combines the doctrine of non-reviewability 
with the complex and explosive questions of plant relocation, 
vesting of seniority rights, etc., you have the potential ingre-
dients necessary for unions and/or employers to begin con-
sidering new tribunals of original and/ or appellate jurisdic-
tion. In effect, I am suggesting that perhaps on the immediate 
horizon is the need for a middle ground regarding the 
reviewability of certain arbitration awards." 
The fear, to put the matter baldly, is of the power of the arbi-
trator to render a "bad," non-reviewable decision. One result, as 
our survey shows, has been the expenditure of much energy and 
thought on possible collective bargaining answers to this problem, 
usually aimed at contract provisions limiting the scope of the 
arbitrator's authority, and, hopefully, increasing the opportunity 
for attack upon "improper" assumptions of arbitral authority. 
Another result has been to consider or undertake changes in the 
"law" through legislation which would increase the scope of judi-
cial review of arbitration proceedings. 
We shall not attempt here to report in detail on either of these 
two approaches to the "problem" of arbitral power. This will be 
done elsewhere. For present purposes it will suffice to make some 
very general, and to some extent obvious, observations. The collec-
tive bargaining approach to the problem presents the parties with 
an entire gamut of possibilities, ranging, on the one hand, from 
total rejection of arbitration, or provision for its use on an ad hoc 
consensual basis only, to the inclusion in the agreement of specific 
and detailed limitations on the use of the process both as to subject 
matter and as to remedy, even including the requirement of judi-
cial determination of "arbitrability" upon demand of either party 
as a prerequisite to arbitral jurisdiction to proceed.9 There is 
9 The most widely publicized recent example of the restrictive approach is reprc• 
sented by the elaborate provisions which General Electric Company succeeded in obtain-
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little doubt that carefully written contractual restrictions on the 
scope of arbitration would reduce substantially the dangers of 
"usurpation" of authority by arbitrators, not only because arbitra-
tors in general can be expected to respect specific limitations on 
their authority, but also because, if they do not, the courts will be 
available to patch any obvious breaches in the dam. We use the 
word "obvious" advisedly, however, because we do not wish at 
this point to indicate any pre-judgment of the kinds of decisions 
which the courts might make in a proper application of the 1960 
trilogy cases where, for example, there might be a dispute over 
the meaning of the very language used by the parties in their 
attempt to define the limits of arbitral authority. 
Nor, of course, is there any doubt that the "problem" of arbi-
tral authority could be met through legislation, and in some mea-
sure resolved. The scope of judicial review of arbitrability issues, 
as now restricted by the 1960 trilogy decisions, could be enlarged. 
Indeed, provision could be made for a general "appellate" review 
of arbitrators' decisions, both as to fact and as to "law," either with 
or without requiring judicial deference to any of the conclusions 
reached by the arbitrator. It seems obvious, however, that the 
commonly accepted values of the arbitration process will apply 
inversely with the extent of resort to the courts to avoid either 
the use or the results of the process. This is not to say that the 
courts should not be available-indeed, under our law they must 
be-to prevent assumptions of authority by the arbitrator which 
the parties clearly intended to withhold from him.10 But we seri-
ously question whether the risk of improvident, unsound, or in-
supportable decisions, either on issues of arbitral authority or on 
the merits of the issue of contract interpretation or application-
and such risk there undoubtedly is-should be "remedied" 
ing in its 1963 negotiations with the IUE. This was one instance in which management 
decided to make the "arbitrability" issue a major one, and evidently succeeded in its 
objectives. Many of our management respondents have thought that, ideally, a major 
effort of this kind would be desirable, but for various reasons have either refrained from 
presenting the issue in collective bargaining or, having made proposals, have ultimately 
withdrawn them. Many other respondents, however, succeeded in negotiating limitations 
on the arbitrator's authority. 
10 While the Supreme Court in the 1960 trilogy cases reduced the scope of judicial 
authority to reject the arbitration process, the Court recognized that "the question of 
arbitrability is for the courts to decide." United Steelworkers v. Warrior 8e Gulf Nav. Co., 
363 U.S. 574, 583 n.7 (1963). The Court was addressing its remarks to the point that, 
except for parties subject to the Railway Labor Act or to a few state statutes (applicable 
to public utilities, and then only where not "pre-empted" by the National Labor Rela-
tions Act), arbitration in this country rests not upon legislative mandate, but upon the 
agreement of the parties. 
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through increased availability of resort to the courts, at least as 
our judicial system is now constructed in relation to such ques-
tions. Whether a separate set of federal "labor courts" might be 
a more appropriate answer, perhaps even to the exclusion of pri-
vate arbitration as in some other countries, is a different question 
which we will not explore here.11 
Some of our respondents, while sharing a general aversion to 
increased judicial intervention, wonder if some method of meet-
ing the problem might be found within the arbitration system 
itself. Thus there is posed the question of how to obtain the re-
view of an arbitration award without unduly sacrificing the values 
of the present arbitration process. This presupposes that judicial 
review, despite the 1960 trilogy, is still available to prevent clear 
excesses of jurisdiction, and on other grounds disassociated from 
the "merits" of the underlying issue of contract interpretation, 
such as lack of a fair hearing. 
A few of our respondents suggest that the National Academy 
of Arbitrators, on its own initiative, should establish review proce-
dures. This suggestion reveals a lack of understanding of the func-
tions of the Academy. The Academy is a professional organization 
concerned with the quality of the labor dispute arbitration proc-
ess.12 It has some 310 members, including many, if not most, of 
11 Notable instances of the use of "labor courts" to decide contract interpretation 
matters are to be found in France, Germany, and some of the Scandinavian countries. 
See generally BRAUN, LABoR DISPUTES AND THEIR SETILEMENT chs. IX-XI (rev. ed. 1955); 
MYERS, INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS IN SWEDEN (1951); SLABY, THE LABOR COURT IN NORWAY 
(Oslo Norwegian Academic Press, 1952); 2 SMITH, LABOR LA.w, CASES AND MATERIALS 188-96 
(1954); Adlercreutz, Some Features of Swedish Collective Labour Law, 10 MODERN L. REv. 
137, 140, 142-48 (1947); Cole, The Role of the Labor Courts in Western Germany, 18 
J. PoL. 479-98 (1956); Cole, National Socialism and the German Labor Courts, 3 J. PoL. 
169 (1941); Colton, The Rejection of Compulsory Arbitration in France: The New Law 
on the Settlement of Labor Disputes, 6 ARB. J. (n.s.) 42 (1951); Kerr, Collective Bargaining 
in Postwar Germany, 5 IND. &: LAB. REL. REv. 323, 335-36 (1951-52); Kronstein, Collective 
Bargaining in Germany: Before 1933 and After 1945, l AM. J. COMP. L. 199, 203, 211 
(1952); Lester, Reflections on Collective Bargaining in Britain and Sweden, 10 IND. &: LAB. 
REL. REv. 375, 386, 386 n.37, 399 (1956-57); McPherson, Basic Issues in German Labor 
Court Structure, 5 LAB. L.J. 439 (1954); Meyers, Labor Relations in France, 3 CALIF. 
MGMT. REv. 46 (1961); Nye, The Status of the Collective Labor Agreement in France, 
55 MICH. L. REv. 655 (1957); Reich, Collective Bargaining: The United States and Ger• 
many, 8 LAB. L.J. 339, 345-46 (1957); Schmidt &: Heineman, Enforcement of Collective 
Bargaining Agreements in Swedish Law, 14 U. CHI. L. REv. 184 (1946-47); Summers, Col-
lective Power and Individual Rights in the Collective Agreement-A Comparison of 
Swedish and American Law, 72 YALE L.J. 421 (1963); Taft, Book Review, 1 IND. &: LAB. 
REL. REV. 163 (1947-48). 
12 The Academy was organized in 1947. Article II, § 1 of its constitution provides: 
"The purposes for which the Academy is formed are: To establish and foster the highest 
standards of integrity, competence, honor, and character among those engaged in the 
arbitration of industrial disputes on a professional basis; to adopt and encourage the 
acceptance of and adherence to canons of ethics to govern the conduct of arbitrators; to 
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the more active and experienced arbitrators in the country. It can 
and does seek to improve the arbitration process through its edu-
cational, research, and other activities, but for it to offer parties, 
through some constituent group of members, the function of re-
view of the decisions rendered by their arbitrator would be foreign 
to its purposes and, as a practical matter, inconceivable. This would 
be like asking a bar association or the American Medical Associa-
tion to establish a "tribunal" to review the "merits" of a profes-
sional opinion rendered by one of its members as distinguished 
from questions of ethics. 
Another suggestion is that the appointing or designating agen-
cies (The Federal Mediation & Conciliation Service, The Ameri-
can Arbitration Association, and state agencies having similar 
functions) establish review procedures. This again must be dis-
missed as an unlikely solution, although for somewhat different 
reasons. These agencies, like the Academy, are concerned with 
the quality of the arbitration process, but their primary responsi-
bility is to provide the parties with the names of prospective arbi-
trators. By virtue of the fact that they do provide an appointment 
service, however, they have an opportunity not open to the Acad-
emy to provide the parties with whom they deal a means of obtain-
ing arbitral review either by the agency itself or by some appellate 
tribunal of arbitrators established by the agency. We seriously 
question whether review of the merits of a decision by the appoint-
ing agency would be acceptable to most parties, or, for that matter, 
to the agency. On the other hand, review by a tribunal established 
by the agency, or under ad hoc procedures developed by the 
agency, could be an additional service offered. Utilization of any 
such review procedure would have to be based upon a mutual 
consent, voluntary basis, although parties obviously could agree 
in advance that the procedure would be available. If an agency 
were to make review by such a tribunal a condition on the availa-
bility of the agency's services, it would probably be taking a big 
step toward going out of business altogether. 
There are other ways, however, to obtain arbitral review, 
short of going to the courts. One method is for the arbitrator him-
self to provide for such review even though he is functioning 
promote the study and understanding of the arbitration of industrial disputes; to en-
courage friendly association among the members of the profession; to cooperate with 
other organizations, institutions, and learned societies interested in industrial relations; 
and to do any and all things which shall be appropriate in the furtherance of these 
purposes." 
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under a standard arbitration provision. Under orthodox arbitra-
tion law the "jurisdiction" of the arbitrator terminates with the 
rendering of the award. There may be ways around this problem, 
however. One, suggested by Professor (and Arbitrator) Edgar A. 
Jones, is to include in the award a provision delaying its finality 
for a specific period during which either party may file a request 
for rehearing or reconsideration, state the basis for such request, 
and serve notice of such request upon the other party, who will 
then have the opportunity to reply.13 Jurisdiction would be "re-
tained" to entertain any such request, and to reconsider or rehear 
the matter. A less formal method of providing this kind of oppor-
tunity would be for the arbitrator, on his own motion, to send to 
the parties a draft of the "proposed" decision and opinion. This 
procedure was suggested for possible consideration by Sylvester 
Garrett in his presidential address at the 1964 Annual Meeting of 
the National Academy of Arbitrators.14 
Another obvious way to obtain review is for the parties to 
establish their own appellate system. So far as we are aware, the 
instances of this are few, but they are noteworthy partially because 
of their variant characteristics. One type of procedure is to be 
found in the newspaper industry. Under many agreements in the 
industry involving the Pressmen's Union, an arbitration decision 
made by an arbitrator selected by the immediate parties to the 
dispute may be appealed to an International Board of Arbitration 
consisting of three members of the Board of Directors of the Press-
men's Union, three members of the Special Standing Committee 
of the American Newspaper Publishers Association (ANPA) and 
a seventh or "neutral" member chosen from a pre-selected panel 
of ten impartial arbitrators. The suggested standard contract lan-
guage providing for appeals is in broad terms, and there are no 
specified grounds for appeal. Despite this fact, our information is 
that appeals are infrequent.15 
Another and quite different approach is represented in the 
agreements between Allis-Chalmers Manufacturing Company and 
its various UAW locals. Although there is no "master agreement," 
the local agreements contain uniform arbitration provisions, which 
give either party the right "to request the Impartial Referee to 
reconsider his decision or any part thereof or rehear any issue 
13 Jones, Arbitration and the Dilemma of Possible Error, 11 LAB. L.J. 1023 (1960). 
14 This address will appear in the published Proceedings of the meeting. 
15 See Appendix infra. 
1964] LABOR ARBITRATION 1125 
involved." The procedures to be followed are carefully spelled 
out and include the specification of time limits applicable both 
to the parties and to the Referee.16 As in the Pressmen's-ANPA 
case, the contracts do not specify the standards to be used by the 
Referee in determining whether or not to grant a request to 
reconsider or rehear. Although requests for review have been in-
frequent, there have been reversals or modifications of original rul-
ings in a few cases despite the psychological and practical difficul-
ties which presumably would make the Referee reluctant to reach 
this result. It should be mentioned, however, that the Allis-Chal-
mers contracts, and in general practice under them, anticipate the 
use of "permanent" (in the usual sense) arbitrators, and this may 
be a factor of some significance in appraising the utility of the pro-
cedure. 
These various possibilities for obtaining arbitral review merit 
serious consideration. The procedure suggested by Professor Jones 
possibly involves the objection that the arbitrator has exceeded his 
authority under the contract, although probably not fatally so in 
view of the implications of the Warrior & Gulf trilogy. Moreover, 
we question the wisdom of introducing any such procedural de-
vice, or the less formal equivalent suggested by Arbitrator Garrett, 
without an advance understanding with the parties that the proce-
dure will or may be used. The parties' interest in shaping their 
arbitration procedure seems to argue that they should not be taken 
by surprise in respect to a matter as important as this, especially 
since most parties expect the arbitrator's initial decision to be 
final. Mr. Garrett recognized that the utility and viability of his 
16 The Allis-Chalmers-UAW contracts provide: 
"IO. Either party shall have the right to request the Impartial Referee to recon-
sider his decision or any part thereof or rehear any issue involved, subject to the 
following: 
"a. The requesting party shall send its written request to the Impartial Referee 
and the other party as promptly as possible but in no event later than 48 hours (ex-
cluding Saturdays, Sundays and holidays) following receipt of the Impartial Referee's 
decision, and 
"b. The requesting party shall send its brief in support of its request to the Im-
partial Referee and the other party within seven (7) calendar days of the receipt of 
the decision. 
"The other party shall have five (5) days to file any objections to the request, with 
a copy to the other party. No further documents may be filed except at the request of 
the Referee. The Referee shall decide within seven (7) calendar days whether or not 
to reconsider or rehear, and such decision shall be final and binding. 
"11. If the Referee's decision is to rehear, such rehearing shall be given priority 
over other pending matters and shall be held promptly. The decision shall be issued 
within thirty (30) days following any such rehearing. Such decision shall be final and 
binding.'' 
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suggested procedure may depend on the arbitrator's relationship 
with the parties, and that the opportunities for its use are obvi-
ously better in the "permanent" than in the ad hoc situation. 
It would seem that a case can be made for some kind of review 
procedure within the arbitration process, although we believe it 
should be one worked out by the parties, not compelled by the 
arbitrator. Arbitrators occasionally do make mistakes, however ex-
perienced and conscientious they may be, and the best interests of 
the parties and of the arbitration process may well be served by 
. making provision for their correction. Of the various possible 
procedures available for this purpose, it seems that one which 
would give the original arbitrator the opportunity to review his 
own decision is preferable to independent review by an "appel-
late" arbitrator or arbitrators. The latter is likely to involve more 
time and expense than the former, and we doubt that the over-all 
results would be any better. The original arbitrator, assuming 
(as we must) his basic honesty, integrity, competence, and con-
scientiousness, will very likely have the capacity to be persuaded 
that he has erred, if there are proper grounds for a claim of serious 
error, and he will have the courage to admit his error. Indeed, it 
seems to us that he is the one who should have the initial oppor-
tunity to make the assessment.17 
The scope of the "review," however established, is a difficult 
substantive problem. We doubt, for example, that it should be 
available to enable a party to present new evidence or to change 
his theory of the case. Slothfulness in the initial preparation and 
presentation should not be encouraged. But experience with a 
review procedure will provide the necessary basis for judgment 
concerning the criteria for reviewability which should be devel-
oped by the arbitrator or prescribed by the parties. A priori doc-
trinaire positions should be avoided at this juncture, tempting 
though they may be. 
To conclude on the subject of "review" of arbitration deci-
sions, we repeat that this seems to be a matter of genuine and 
17 One of us (Smith) for some years has served as Impartial Referee under some of 
the Allis-Chalmers-UAW agreements, and has been confronted from time to time with 
requests for reconsideration or rehearing. although such requests have been infrequent. 
Some have been denied; others granted. On one occasion the Referee granted the re-
quest, in this instance by the Company, on the basis that he had misread part of the 
testimony appearing in the transcript of the hearing, and that this fact may have been 
a material factor in the analysis of the case. The ultimate result was a reversal of the 
earlier decision. The Referee in this instance, although understandably embarrassed, 
appreciated the opportunity to review his findings of fact and determination. 
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understandable concern to many who basically believe in arbitra-
tion. We think there is room for constructive experimentation in 
this area provided the review procedures are kept out of the courts, 
except to the extent now available, and provided review is struc-
tured within the arbitration process itself. We believe this is a mat-
ter which could properly be on the collective bargaining agenda. 
2. Procedural Matters 
Many of our respondents' criticisms are directed at alleged 
procedural deficiencies. There appears to be general agreement 
that the arbitrator should control the hearing, conduct it in an 
orderly fashion, and not "let it get out of hand." Too often, it is 
said, the arbitrator allows the hearing to degenerate into a form-
less discussion that strays from the issue and precludes an orderly 
presentation of the case. One management representative com-
ments: 
"Many of the arbitration cases in which I have partici-
pated have been unnecessarily lengthened and greatly confused 
by the unwillingness of the arbitrator to really act as a hear-
ing officer in control of his own hearing. While there is no 
need to develop the judicial attitude of a Federal judge, it 
would be of immense help to raise the arbitration hearing 
above the level of a bar room brawl." 
Somewhat related is the view, expressed frequently by our respon-
dents, especially lawyers, that there should be more extensive use 
of the "rules of evidence." A union attorney stated: 
"My most important concern is that arbitrators pay closer 
attention to procedural due process. I will predict that in the 
near future, a new line of court attack on arbitration rulings 
will commence on procedural due process grounds unless arbi-
trators pay greater attention to these requirements. For exam-
ple, some arbitrators seem to consider that rules of evidence 
are useless technicalities to be scorned by broad-thinking men. 
They forget that rules of evidence are usually based upon 
rules of reason and if they continue to admit hearsay, wholly 
irrelevant matters, and similar oddities, there will be difficulty 
ahead . . . . It is my personal belief that an arbitrator who 
pays closer attention to procedural due process, including 
reasonable rules of evidence, is more likely to reach a correct 
result." 
On the other hand, there are those, including some who advo-
cate more formal procedures and greater reliance on the rules of 
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evidence, who object that the arbitration process is becoming too 
"legalistic." The following comment is illustrative: 
"I am of the opinion that arbitration is becoming too 
legalistic. Originally, arbitration was designed for laymen to 
settle promptly disputes that arise between the company and 
the union. Now it appears that arbitration is being too heavily 
influenced by precedent and court procedures, and engaged 
in, in my opinion, to an unhealthy extent by the legal pro-
fession." 
Another criticism of some intensity concerns the use of post-
hearing briefs. Some feel that "briefs . . . should not be prolif-
erated, especially on request of the arbitrator, except in cases 
which are unusually technical or complex." Complaints about 
the use of briefs stem in large part from the desire to minimize 
delays and costs. There is also, however, some feeling that on 
occasions arbitrators improperly use briefs as "crutches." As one 
respondent remarks, "there are some arbitrators who make use of 
briefs as an escape hatch so that the decision consists of the briefs 
of the respective parties quoted in 'full' [in lieu, we suppose, of 
the arbitrator's own summary and analysis of the evidence and 
arguments] and the award." 
In the general area of arbitration procedure there exists not 
only a wide range of opinion, but also, we suspect, some confusion 
of thought about the meaning of terms such as "legalisms," "legal-
istic," and "rules of evidence." We doubt that there are many 
clearly validated principles in relation to such matters, includ-
ing the extent to which the arbitrator, as distinguished from the 
parties, should assume the basic responsibility for procedural mat-
ters. Moreover, there is probably no real consensus on most of 
these procedural problems among the arbitrators themselves, ex-
cept perhaps the view that there is no virtue in consistency and 
uniformity, and that the parties, subject to some limitations, "can 
have it the way they want it." Most persons concerned with the 
process would probably find their greatest area of agreement on 
the point that the arbitrator has a responsibility for keeping the 
proceeding under control. But even this is subject to the qualifica-
tion that the parties sometimes have their own, mutually accepta-
ble notions of procedure, to which the arbitrator may properly 
be inclined to defer. 
In general, complaints about the looseness of arbitration pro-
ceedings in the matter of presentation of evidence are probably 
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factually sound. It is our impression that arbitrators do not, as a 
rule, strictly apply the "rules of evidence," if they apply them at 
all. This is doubtless due in part to the fact that many arbitrators 
and party representatives are not lawyers, but even more to the 
belief that strict adherence to these rules is inappropriate and un-
necessary in an arbitration proceeding. The result in many in-
stances undoubtedly is the burdening of the "record" with much 
"hearsay" testimony and documentary evidence of questionable 
probative value. In some cases the receipt of this questionable 
evidence prolongs the hearing, but in most cases the actual result 
is probably otherwise, since strict application of the rules of evi-
dence would put parties to the necessity of producing more vali-
dating testimony and witnesses who may not be readily available, 
and would involve the hearing in much time-consuming squabbling 
over the "admissibility," "materiality," and "competence" of prof-
fered evidence. 
We believe there is no clearly defined road map to direct the 
parties or the arbitrator in the handling of these evidentiary 
problems. Here again the arbitrator may find that the parties 
have established their own procedures, which occasionally indicate 
complete rejection of orthodox notions concerning the presenta-
tion of evidence.18 Laying aside such situations, however, in which 
18 For many years the Chrysler-UAW "appeal board" procedure involved no pre-
sentation of oral testimony at the "Impartial Chairman" level, and, indeed, no oppor-
tunity for the Impartial Chairman (the arbitrator) even to view the plant premises, ma-
chine, etc., involved in the case. The evidence consisted entirely of written statements 
signed by persons claiming to have knowledge of the relevant facts, and of the pre-
arbitration written presentations of the parties. This procedure was reviewed by David 
A. Wolff, for many years the Umpire, and by Louis A. Crane and Howard A. Cole, who 
have been associated with Mr. Wolff in Wolff, Crane&: Cole, The Chrysler-UAW Umpire 
System, THE ArulITRATOR AND THE PARTIES lll (BNA 1958). On the "appellate" nature of 
the procedure the authors stated: 
"The appeal board believes such statements to be generally as, or more, reliable 
than oral accounts, under oath or otherwise, given in the excitement, and under the 
circumstances, of direct discussion. Although on occasion the actual presence and 
participation of witnesses might be of some help where credibility is a factor, almost 
always the type of proof called for and submitted is more than adequate to enable 
an accurate determination of the truth. Further, the 'closed' session rule encourages 
discussions which are frank and to the point, avoids conditions which might lead 
to the rekindling of old fires, and, it is believed, serves to provide, over-all, more 
effective and expeditious presentations as well as better relations between the parties." 
Id. at 125. 
These views, if accurate, must come as something of a surprise to lawyers and others 
familiar with customary judicial procedures. It is interesting that in 196!1 the procedure 
described above was modified, so that now the Chrysler "Umpire" hearings involve the 
presentation of evidence in the manner customary in most arbitration proceedings. 
The current Bendix Corporation-UAW Master Agreement expressly forbids the pres-
entation of witnesses at an Umpire hearing. As a result, the evidence presented at hear-
ings resembles that which earlier characterized the Chrysler hearings, with the exception 
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the arbitrator may or may not feel comfortable, we think the 
answer lies not in a formula of strict adherence to the so-called 
"rules of evidence" (which present their own special problems 
and are less rigid and mechanical than might be supposed even 
in court proceedings), but rather in an increased awareness that 
some kinds of evidence are more trustworthy than others, that the 
opposing party has a natural interest in minimizing the possible 
impact of evidence which he considers untrustworthy or irrele-
vant, and that a party has the responsibility of doing his home 
work prior to the hearing and making the best case he can. 
One of the difficulties in discussing the "rules of evidence" lies 
in the failure to distinguish between the rules relating to relevancy 
and materiality and the rules relating to admissibility (e.g., con-
cerning "hearsay" testimony or records which are not properly 
authenticated). The looseness of the arbitrator in being willing to 
listen ad nauseam to testimony alleged to be completely irrelevant 
is sometimes due to his inability, at least until the hearing is well 
along, to determine precisely what the issue is. Stipulations of the 
issue are rare, and very often the claims made are so vague or so 
broad that questions of relevancy and materiality simply cannot be 
decided at the time the proffer of evidence is made. We agree, 
however, that in this area arbitrators are fairly subject to some 
criticism. Too often, we fear, the answer, "I'll accept it for what 
it's worth," or ''I'll determine its relevancy later," places an unfair 
burden on the opposing party who should not ordinarily be com-
pelled to defend himself against an improper line of attack or 
array of evidence. Perhaps the arbitrator should spend whatever 
time is necessary at the outset of the hearing, within reasonable 
limits (and limits there are!) in an attempt to determine precisely 
what the issues are (at least to his satisfaction), and thus place 
himself in a position to exclude matters which are clearly irrele-
vant or immaterial. One need not be a lawyer to make rulings of 
this nature. At the same time, it must be recognized that arbitra-
tion procedures are highly variable, and the extent to which the 
arbitrator may invoke rules of exclusion may depend upon the 
degree of sophistication and the expectations of the parties as well 
as his or their conception of the function of arbitration.19 
that it appears to be understood that the Company and Union representatives who are 
entitled to be present at the hearings are likewise entitled, almost as if they were ordi-
nary witnesses, to present statements of pertinent facts alleged to be within their personal 
knowledge or otherwise known to them. 
19 The late Dean Shulman, in one of the most significant of the many analyses of 
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A brief comment on the use of briefs may be in order. There 
are probably few arbitrators who would not agree that in the 
complex case, especially where there is no transcript, a brief can 
be of great value. A brief also has special utility in those instances 
in which the parties have not made adequate presentations at the 
hearing, although the parties should not be tempted in such cases 
to use the brief as a substitute for evidence. We believe that good 
briefs are usually helpful to the arbitrator and may, in fact, reduce 
the amount of required "study" time, thus expediting the deci-
sional process. We use the term "good" advisedly, because too often 
briefs are so poor as to be worthless. In view of the criticisms ex-
pressed by our respondents, it seems apparent that the arbitrator 
should use caution in asking for briefs when the parties seem 
reluctant to supply them. But it must be remembered that he has 
the burden and responsibility of deciding the case, and should not 
hesitate to ask for briefs when he feels they are needed. Nor may he 
properly deny a party the opportunity to file a brief. 
One device which profitably could be used more widely is a 
pre-hearing brief or statement by each party, containing the party's 
version of the issues and the facts, for presentation at the hearing. 
This procedure is used under the General Motors-UAW umpire 
system, and our understanding is that both parties consider it 
useful. In our own experience we have found such statements to 
be useful. It occurs to us that if pre-hearing statements are to be 
prepared, the parties might consider exchanging them prior to the 
hearing, and might even send them to the arbitrator, so that posi-
tions will be known and, perhaps, a better basis will be established 
for stipulating facts and thus reducing hearing time.20 
labor dispute arbitration, even suggested that rigid rules of exclusion may unduly restrict 
the information gathering function of the hearing. See Shulman, Reason, Contract, and 
Law in Labor Relations, 68 HARv. L. REv. 999, 1017 (1955), in which he stated: 
"The more serious danger is not that the arbitrator will hear too much irrelevancy, 
but rather that he will not hear enough of the relevant. Indeed, one advantage fre• 
quently reaped from wide latitude to the parties to talk about their case is that the 
apparent rambling frequently discloses very helpful information which would otherwise 
not be brought out. Rules of procedure which assure adequate opportunity to each party 
to prepare for and meet the other's contentions, or rules designed to encourage full 
consideration and effort at adjustment in the prior stages of the grievance procedure 
may be quite desirable. But they should not be such as to prevent full presentation of 
the controversy to the arbitrator before he is required to make final decision. For that 
would not only limit his resources for sound judgment, but would tend also to create 
dissatisfaction with the system." 
20 We recognize that some will object to this procedure on the ground that it may 
induce the arbitrator to decide the case before he hears it. We will simply state that in 
our judgment this view lacks merit. 
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Another technique which might be used with profit in some 
situations, or at least ought to be considered, is something analo-
gous to the pre-trial conference which is commonly used in judi-
cial proceedings. This would involve a preliminary meeting with 
the arbitrator, or perhaps with a representative of the appointing 
agency (e.g., The American Arbitration Association) if it is in-
volved, in an attempt to resolve any differences which may exist 
- concerning the issues to be decided and to stipulate facts insofar as 
possible. 
To conclude on the matter of arbitration procedure, our sur-
vey indicates some degree of dissatisfaction with the present state 
of affairs. We think some of it is justified, and that there is room 
for improvement. Yet, it is our view that the arbitrator may have 
even more basis of complaint than the parties. He often faces the 
difficult tasks of making some "record" of the proceeding without 
the assistance of a reporter, trying to ascertain the real issues where 
there has been inadequate preparation by one side or the other 
(and wondering whether and how to obtain facts which are lack-
ing), sifting the chaff from the wheat in what has been presented, 
and, withal, maintaining some kind of image for the parties that 
he is the "impartial judge" of their dispute. We see need for a 
more thorough examination of the question of the arbitrator's 
role and responsibilities, not excluding those situations in which 
the parties seem to feel that the entire matter of procedure is theirs 
to decide, if they can agree. We frankly think that more can be 
learned from the arbitrators than from the parties on the problems 
of procedure encountered in arbitration, and that the arbitrators 
should assume a greater responsibility than they have in the past 
in indicating their views and suggesting needed improvements. 
3. The Appointing Agencies and Their Responsibilities-
The Development of "New" Arbitrators 
From a substantial number of our respondents come criticisms 
of the appointing agencies, which are principally The Federal 
Mediation & Conciliation Service and The American Arbitration 
Association. The following types of complaints are most frequent: 
(I) The agencies are not sufficiently selective in placing individ-
uals on their rosters of available arbitrators (and the corollary 
proposition that only "qualified" people should be included); 
(2) the names of the same arbitrators appear too frequently on 
the lists or "panels" sent to the parties; (3) insufficient information 
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is supplied to the parties about the people included on the panels; 
and (4) the agencies at times improperly include the name of an 
"objectionable" arbitrator upon a panel list. 
The criticism of insufficient selectivity on the part of the 
agencies in adding names of potential arbitrators to their rosters 
is accompanied very often by the claim that there is a pressing 
need for developing a greater supply of competent, experienced 
arbitrators.21 Obviously, the agencies and the parties face the di-
lemma that the supply of competent, experienced arbitrators can-
not be increased except by the development of new arbitrators; 
and the new arbitrators cannot become "experienced" except as 
they are used by the parties. 
The problem of increasing the supply of competent and "ac-
ceptable" arbitrators is not easy to solve. A substantial portion of 
our current crop are alumni of the War Labor Board (of World 
War II) or the Wage Stabilization Board (of the Korean War). 
Not only did their governmental experience bring them into 
active contact with management and labor representatives, but, 
since they received governmental appointments as "neutrals," 
they acquired a basis for subsequent acceptability as arbitrators 
when their government service ended. But this group of arbitra-
tors is limited in number and often so busy as to make them un-
available except to their regular client_ele. A new world crisis, 
which would require us again to establish a tripartite apparatus 
for labor dispute resolution, would be the most obvious (but 
clearly unwelcome) way to provide new talent for the arbitration 
field. We must find other methods of meeting the problem. 
The appointing (designating) agencies have the greatest op-
portunity and perhaps the major responsibility in this area. The 
American Arbitration Association through its regional offices is 
constantly attempting to obtain the acceptance by the parties of 
inexperienced, but, in the Association's judgment, qualified men. 
The Regional Manager, by virtue of his personal contacts with 
the parties in his region, is frequently able to persuade them to 
"try out" a new man. This process has had considerable success 
in bringing new arbitrators into the field.22 The Association does 
21 This suggestion, in fact, is the one most frequently advanced by our respondents, 
both management and union. 
22 During the period 1956-1958, inclusive, 149 arbitrators listed on the Association's 
national labor dispute arbitration roster received their initial appointments in cases. 
During the period 1959-1961, inclusive, the figure was 124. Most of these individuals 
were actually added to the AAA panel prior to the respective three-year periods. The 
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not require prior arbitration experience as a prerequisite for 
inclusion of an individual on its national panel or roster of labor 
dispute arbitrators. However, endorsements from labor and man-
agement representatives are required, and, in addition, the Asso-
ciation's Regional Manager usually makes an independent local 
"check" of the individual's repute in the labor-management com-
munity. 
The regulations of the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Ser-
vice state that it will not add a name to its roster unless the individ-
ual has had "experience in the labor arbitration field or its equiva-
lent."23 We are informed that, while the Service lays considerable 
stress upon actual arbitration experience, it gives a liberal inter-
pretation to the term "equivalent," and that actual prior arbitra-
tion experience is not, in fact, a prerequisite for the inclusion on 
the roster.24 It is appropriate, we think, to note that the informa-
tion which we are reporting concerning the internal operations of 
number of persons added to the Association's national panel was 51 in 1959, 61 in 1960, 
and 56 in 1961. A majority of these had had no previous actual arbitration experience, 
although a good many had had previous labor relations experience with the government 
or in other capacities. Some of these persons were selected by parties in the year of 
their appointment; others, subsequently. (Information supplied by Joseph Murphy, Vice-
President of the American Arbitration Association.) 
23 The Regulations of the Service provide as follows: 
"It is the policy of the Service to maintain on its roster only those arbitrators who 
are experienced, qualified, and acceptable, and who adhere to ethical standards. Appli-
cants for inclusion on its roster must not only be well-grounded in the field of labor-
management relations, but, also, possess experience in the labor arbitration field or its 
equivalent. (Arbitrators employed full time as representatives of management or labor 
are not included on the Service's roster.) After a careful screening and evaluation of the 
applicant's experience, the Service contacts representatives of both labor and manage-
ment, as qualified arbitrators must be acceptable to those who utilize its arbitration fa. 
cilities. The responses to such inquiries are carefully weighed before an otherwise quali-
fied arbitrator is included on the Service's roster." 29 C.F.R. § 1404.2 (1963). 
24 During the period March 1, 1961, through December 31, 1963, the Service added 
168 names to its roster. (The total number on its roster now is approximately 850.) 
Approximately 120 of the persons added during this period had no, or very limited, 
previous arbitration experience. Of those without any previous arbitration experience, 
33 have acquired varying degrees of acceptability, having been selected by parties in one 
or more cases. During this period the Service issued to parties a total of 12,025 "panels" 
(suggested lists of arbitrators from whom the selections could be made for particular 
cases). Of these panels 4,097 included some one of the 168 individuals whose names were 
added to the Service's roster during the period, and these submissions resulted in a total 
of 271 selections of some one of such persons in individual cases. The names of the 33 
inexperienced arbitrators who were selected in one or more cases were submitted on 1,774 
of the panels sent out during the period, and such individuals were selected in 136 cases. 
A cursory examination of the biographical information available on the 168 arbitra• 
tors added to the Service's roster during this period shows that a substantial proportion 
are lawyers, and that of the 33 inexperienced arbitrators who developed some acceptibility, 
a very large proportion are practicing attorneys. (The foregoing information was sup• 
plied to us in conferences with H. T. Herrick, Jr., General Counsel of the Service.) 
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FMCS is based upon policies of the Service as administered un~er 
its present director, William E. Simkin. It is common knowledge 
that the Service's policies and methods of operation have varied 
over the years, due principally to differences in attitude and ap-
proach of the particular director. 
Whether the agencies have adequate standards for pre-judg-
ment of the individual's basic qualifications we are not prepared 
to say. In view of some of the criticisms we have received, it may 
be that they should be more careful than they are in adding 
names to their rosters. In any event, we think the procedures used 
by the agencies in adding new names should be given greater 
publicity, and subjected to constructive appraisal by all concerned. 
We think the agencies should include an assessment of potential 
acceptability among factors considered in determining whether or 
not to add a name to its roster, but they should be concerned pri-
marily with basic competence, and attempt to deal with the matter 
of acceptability by affirmative measures designed to introduce the 
new man to the labor-management community.25 Appraisals of the 
individual by labor and management representatives in the commu-
nity are relevant considerations in the determination of his probable 
acceptability, but we doubt that any prior labor-management en-
dorsement should be an indispensable prerequisite. Instead, the 
agency should concentrate on methods for judging potential com-
petence and let these be the principal bases for the additions of 
new names. 
But it scarcely needs to be stated that it is difficult to prescribe 
a set of educational and other standards as the sine qua non for 
prediction of success as an arbitrator. Possibly some guidance is 
available in an analysis of the kinds of educational and other 
25 When the FMCS receives an application for addition to its national roster or 
"panel" of arbitrators, it requests the applicant to fill out a questionnaire giving details 
of his past experience and background, including previous arbitration and labor relations 
experience. If a review of the questionnaire shows a sufficient labor relations or arbitra• 
tion background to suggest that the applicant may be qualified to serve as an arbitrator, 
the Service further investigates the applicant's background through what is called a Re-
gional Director's "check." The Regional Director, or a field mediator acting under his 
supervision, interviews all references whose names are submitted by the applicant. In 
addition, persons active in the labor-management communities of the geographic areas 
in which the applicant has acquired his labor relations or arbitration experience are 
interviewed for the purpose, among other things, of ascertaining whether the applicant 
is deemed "acceptable." The Regional Director's reports on these interviews are given 
great weight by the Director of the Service when considering an applicant who has had 
little or no previous arbitration experience. (This information was supplied to us in 
conference with H. T. Herrick, Jr., General Counsel of the Service.) 
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backgrounds possessed by experienced arbitrators. The most ob-
vious group available for this kind of study is the membership of 
the National Academy of Arbitrators, concerning whom the Acad-
emy itself has recently released some factual studies. But even if 
such criteria do become available, actual competence can be deter-
mined only through experience. At this point, the parties must 
assume some responsibility. 
We can understand the natural reluctance of the parties to 
try out a new arbitrator, but it may be that they will have more 
confidence in using inexperienced men if they are more certain of 
their general qualifications. Providing the parties with the oppor-
tunity to appraise the agencies' qualification standards, as we have 
suggested, may be a step in this direction. In addition, the agencies 
could do more in publicizing the qualifications of its panel mem-
bers, perhaps by publishing a directory of arbitrators and sending 
out flyers when new names are added.26 The FMCS might also 
consider the possibility of decentralizing its service, at least in some 
respects, to its regional offices in order to facilitate the opportunity 
for the personal contacts with the parties.27 
The two major appointing agencies, with the active support 
and assistance of the National Academy of Arbitrators, have re-
cently undertaken unique types of arbitrator training programs 
designed to meet the dual problems of the "new" arbitrator-lack 
of experience and lack of "acceptability." The first such program 
was begun in the Chicago area in September 1962. Fourteen 
"trainees," mostly from the academic community, were selected 
by the appointing agencies. After a one-day "training institute," 
the trainees were assigned to arbitrators in the area, all of whom 
26 FMCS General Counsel Herrick informs us that the Service has never published 
a complete directory of arbitrators listed on its national panel. In his view, the reluc-
tance of the Service to issue such a directory is based primarily upon the administrative 
inconvenience and cost of maintaining an up-to-date directory, but partly on lack of 
evidence of any significant demand by the parties for such a directory. He points out 
that the list of "available" arbitrators changes constantly, for reasons ranging from the 
arbitrator's inability to take cases at any given time because of other commitments, to 
excessive delay in rendering awards or to disagreements with the Service as to fee policies. 
21 FMCS General Counsel Herrick feels that it would not be desirable for the Service 
to decentralize its panel selection process, which is now performed by a very small staff 
in Washington. Centralized administration, he believes, has resulted in great flexibility, 
particularly in meeting local needs by submission of the names of arbitrators from distant 
areas, where this is indicated, and by finding arbitrators with an expertise fitted to par-
ticular types of cases. In addition, he considers that centralized administration permits 
the Service to use top level judgment in the selection process. Finally, he states that 
while the Service is criticized from time to time by parties dissatisfied with particular 
panels, it has never encountered substantial criticism or significant administrative diffi-
culties which could be attributed to centralized administration. 
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are members of the Academy, and whose cooperation was volun-
teered. Each trainee attended at least one hearing, in each instance 
with the acquiescence of the parties involved. The program con-
templated that the "apprentice" arbitrators would prepare their 
own analyses of the cases heard and draft opinions and awards, 
which were to be scrutinized and criticized by the "journeyman" 
arbitrator after he had rendered his decision. The program was 
continued until August 1963. Judged in terms of the extent to 
which the trainees gained actual acceptability in cases of their 
own up to December 15, 1963, the program was not very success-
ful. But it is perhaps too early to form a judgment on this basis. 
Meanwhile, the appointing agencies have decided to initiate arbi-
trator training programs in two other areas, Northern Ohio and 
Pittsburgh. The latter is under way, and an attempt is being made 
to improve on the methods followed in the Chicago pilot pro-
gram.2s 
One other established and sound method of developing new 
acceptable and experienced arbitrators is through what amounts to 
an apprenticeship with a busy, full-time arbitrator. A relatively 
small number of younger men have been brought into the field 
in this manner through the good offices of some of the most emi-
nent of our veteran arbitrators.29 This process is continuing. The 
difficulty, of course, is that the number of available apprenticeships 
fails by a considerable margin to provide enough new "journey-
men." If the time ever arrives when there are firms of arbitrators, 
as there are in other professional fields, the opportunity for devel-
oping arbitrators through "clerkships" will be greatly enhanced. 
Certain criticisms we have received of the appointing agencies 
do not seem serious or merited. The fact that the same names 
appear too frequently on the lists sent to the parties is in part due 
to the lack of acceptable and available arbitrators, which is es-
pecially acute in some areas of the country, and to the practice of 
28 The NAA Committee on the Training of New Arbitrators, consisting of Chairman 
Pearce Davis, Thomas J. McDermott and Joseph G. Stashower, made a comprehensive 
report and evaluation on these programs at the 1964 Annual Meeting of the Academy. 
This report will appear in the ·published Proceedings of the Academy. 
29 The Board of Governors of the NAA authorized a survey of arbitrators and arbi-
tration for the calendar year 1962. An extensive questionnaire was prepared by a special 
committee of the Academy consisting of Chairman Irving Bernstein, William Gomberg, 
Richard Mittenthal, Frank C. Pierson and Arthur M. Ross, and was mailed to each 
member of the Academy. Some 175 responses were received. Of those responding, 19 
(10.9%) had served some kind of "arbitration apprenticeship" of an average duration 
of 2.6 years. The Committee's report was made at the 1964 Annual Meeting of the Acad-
emy, and will appear as part of the published Proceedings. 
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both agencies of utilizing arbitrators within the area of the dispute 
unless the parties specify otherwise. The basic reason for the latter 
is to minimize "travel" costs. If the parties so desire, either agency 
will provide, upon request, the names of arbitrators in other re-
gions. A difficult problem arises, however, when one party desires 
to use an outside arbitrator, and the other does not. When the 
parties cannot agree on an arbitrator, the agency may be forced 
to make an administrative appointment which may leave both 
parties dissatisfied. This is the type of problem which the parties 
themselves should resolve, but their failure to do so should not 
result in criticism of the appointing agency. 
Both agencies attempt to provide the parties with lists of arbi-
trators, who, the agencies believe, can competently deal with the 
dispute. There is, however, no automatic rotation of names on the 
entire roster. When a request for a panel is received, the type of 
dispute is noted, and panel selections are then made based upon 
the agency's evaluation of the experience and capacity required 
to deal with the issue. The actual selection of panel names is made 
under AAA procedures by the Tribunal Clerk under the super-
vision of the Regional Manager, and under FMCS procedures by 
the General Counsel. All direct designations are made by the Di-
rector of the Service. Obviously, much depends upon the judgment 
of those who make up the lists. Certainly this is an important 
aspect of each agency's work, and one which should be kept under 
constant care and continuous scrutiny within the agency. 
The agencies do not include on a panel the name of an arbi-
trator known to be objectionable to one or both of the parties. In 
selecting arbitrators for panels, FMCS reviews panels which have 
been submitted in current cases involving the same parties, and it 
avoids, wherever possible, listing any arbitrator who is on an out-
standing current panel for the same parties. The AAA follows 
somewhat similar procedures. Each agency reviews selections 
which have been made by the parties in previous cases, and at-
tempts to name people whose acceptability has been demonstrated. 
A name will routinely be included on a panel if both parties re-
quest this, but not upon the request of one party alone. If an ob-
jection is made to the listing of a particular arbitrator, the AAA 
attempts to determine the basis of the objection, and, if possible, 
to resolve the problem. 
It should also be noted, with regard to another criticism made 
by some respondents, that the agencies do review the qualifications 
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of arbitrators. AAA regional managers maintain records pertain-
ing to an individual's acceptability. The Regional Manager also 
reviews the arbitrator's opinion and award and the Tribunal 
Clerk's appraisal of the manner in which the arbitrator conducted 
the hearing. The time between the close of the hearing and the 
issuing of the award is noted along with the fee charged, and all 
of this information is recorded on an arbitrator's Service Record 
Card. When an objection is made regarding an arbitrator's per-
formance, the New York office reviews this information and makes 
its own appraisal. The FMCS has a similar although less formalized 
procedure. It can be assumed that each agency on occasion utilizes 
its appraisals to remove an arbitrator from its roster if such action 
is deemed warranted, although this is probably an infrequent oc-
currence. When it does happen, the individual obviously should 
be apprised of the action and given an opportunity to persuade 
the agency that its judgment is wrong.30 
It seems to us, on the whole, that the agencies are providing a 
helpful and much needed service in connection with the develop-
ment of rosters of competent and experienced arbitrators, and in 
providing a procedure to which the parties may resort for the 
selection of an arbitrator. The quality of the agencies' work seems 
to be doubted by many of our respondents, possibly in some cases 
for lack of information concerning the internal operations of the 
agencies, and in others because of dissatisfaction with some arbi-
trator obtained through the procedures of the agency. It is obvious 
that any agency which assumes the role of developing and screen-
ing rosters of potential arbitrators and of culling names from this 
roster to submit for consideration in a particular case has a serious 
responsibility not only to the parties but to the arbitrators. It is 
equally obvious that the quality of the work of the agency will 
depend to a substantial degree upon the competence and good 
judgment of the personnel who administer the program on a day-
to-day basis, as well as on the general policy standards established 
by the agency's "top command." Some of our respondents think 
that there are, or have been, deficiencies in these respects. 
We do not know to what extent these criticisms are justified. A 
so We wish to thank Robert Coulson, Executive Vice-President of the American Arbi-
tration Association, Herbert Schmertz, former General Counsel of the Federal Mediation 
&: Conciliation Service, H. T. Herrick, Jr., present General Counsel, and Mrs. L. P. Herr-
scher, Manager Detroit Region, American Arbitration Association for their cooperation 
in providing us information concerning the procedures and practices followed by the 
respective agencies, and for their helpful comments. 
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careful evaluation would require much more information than we 
now have concerning the quality of the personnel of the agencies 
and their operating procedure. One of the problems facing the 
agencies in dealing with their potential clientele is the aura of the 
"mystique" in which, perhaps of necessity, they operate. 
4. Delays in Awards 
Our respondents generally complain about delay in the receipt 
of arbitration decisions. Since one of the presumed virtues of the 
arbitration process is the speedy determination of cases, this com-
plaint deserves serious consideration. 
How much time is taken by arbitrators in deciding cases? It is 
common knowledge that this varies with the case and, to some 
degree, with the arbitrator; the extent of the arbitrator's caseload 
necessarily is one of the relevant factors. Fortunately, as a result of 
the recent National Academy of Arbitrators survey of its member-
ship there are some interesting statistical data available.31 
The 158 arbitrators who responded to the Academy's question-
naire issued a total of 6,045 decisions in contract grievance cases 
during 1962. Reports on elapsed time between date of final sub-
mission and issuance of award were submitted for 5,422 of these 
cases, and the tabular summary is as follows: 
DAYS NUMBER OF CASES PERCENT OF TOTAL 
1-15 1,386 25.6 
16-30 2,666 49.2 
31-60 864 15.9 
61-90 234 4.3 
Over 90 272 5.0 
We think these data suggest that the complaints about delays 
may be exaggerated. Awards are issued in some seventy-five per-
cent of the cases within thii:,ty days of the close of the hearing or 
the submission of briefs-a time period which is reasonable despite 
some complaints. It would appear that it is the ten percent of 
cases taking over sixty days which evoke the most justified criti-
cism. 
The FMCS and AAA attempt to meet the problem of exces-
sive delay in issuing awards by requiring that an arbitrator selected 
under their procedures render his award within thirty days after 
the case is heard and any post-hearing briefs are filed. How faith-
31 See note 29 supra. 
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fully arbitrators observe these requirements we do-not know. Pre-
sumably, in most cases the time limit is met. However, there are 
doubtless many instances in which the arbitrator requests and 
receives from the parties an extension of time, and there may even 
be instances of deliberate ignoring of time limits. When the latter 
occurs, there seems to be no effective sanction available to the 
parties other than complaint to the agency. There is the possibility, 
however, that the award could be subjected to legal attack on the 
theory that the parties and the arbitrator, by virtue of their use of 
the appointing agency, have impliedly agreed that the agency's 
rule or policy concerning time limitations shall be observed. Time 
limitations upon the rendering of awards are sometimes written 
into the arbitration provision of the contract, and failure of an 
arbitrator to meet the requirement in the absence of a waiver by 
the parties could produce a legal question concerning its validity 
(a question which we will examine on another occasion). Occa-
sionally these contractual time limits are highly unrealistic, es-
pecially under "umpire" systems where the arbitrator may typi-
cally hear a "docket" of cases in one hearing session, and cannot 
as a practical matter comply with the stipulated time limitation, 
if his awards must be supported by opinions. 
Finally, we suggest that the parties may be placing too much 
emphasis upon the delays attributable to the arbitrator, important 
as this matter may be. We suspect that these delays are minimal 
on the whole when contrasted with the time consumed by the 
parties themselves in handling grievances through the pre-arbitra-
tion steps in the grievance procedure. The "well-aged" grievance 
is not an unusual phenomenon.82 Difficulties in setting hearing 
dates and postponements of dates frequently occur. There are many 
instances in which the parties cause delay by insisting on the filing 
of post-hearing briefs when they are not needed, and by delaying 
their filings through mutual agreement. What we have is a per-
vasive problem, attending the entire process of grievance handling, 
and the malady should receive a complete clinical examination 
rather than one confined to only a part of the anatomy. 
5. The Costs of Arbitration 
Our survey reveals a substantial amount of criticism, principally 
from union sources, concerning arbitrators' fees and the general 
costs of arbitration. This complaint is not new, and it appears to 
82 See Ross, The Well-Aged Arbitration Case, 11 IND. & LAB. REL. REv. 262 (1957-58). 
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be increasing-so we are advised by the appointing agencies. One 
union has carried its concern to the point of calling together the 
arbitrators in the Detroit area for a discussion of the matter. 
Any appraisal of this complaint should begin with an inquiry 
into the facts. We have n9t undertaken any direct research in the 
matter of fees and total costs, but some relevant data are available. 
The arbitrator's "per diem" rate has a significant although ob-
viously inconclusive bearing on his total charge. The American 
Arbitration Association, in analyzing over 1,000 cases decided in 
1954, found that per diem rates "were clustered around the $100 
per day mark," and ranged between $25 and $200.38 We are in-
formed by the Association that during 1962 the per diem rates of 
arbitrators who handled the bulk of the cases ranged from $100 
to $150, and that the average was approximately $125. (The Acad-
emy survey, incidentally, reports a 1962 average in grievance cases 
of $126 per day.) These data thus show increases in per diem rates 
of approximately twenty-five percent for the period 1954 through 
1962. 
In the 1954 AAA study it was found that the "most common 
total fee was within the $200 to $299.99 group," that "the next 
most common fell within the $100.00 to $199.00 total fee range" 
and that "more than 85% of the total fees were within the $399.99 
or less category." Other data compiled by the Association and 
made available to us show that arbitrators' fees per case per hearing 
day, as shown by an analysis of records of arbitrators who received 
more than $1,000 in fees during the year, have increased from 
$276.82 in 1958 to $301.06 in 1961, and a slightly higher figure for 
part of 1963. These data are not easily evaluated because of the 
variables involved, i.e., hearing and study time per comparable 
case and per diem rate. 
A more meaningful study which takes into account these varia-
bles is that recently made by Professor R. W. Fleming, the results 
of which were reported at the 1964 Annual Meeting of the Na-
tional Academy of Arbitrators.34 His study was based on a random 
selection of 100 discharge cases decided in 1951-1952, another 100 
decided in 1956-1957, and a third 100 decided in 1962-1963. His 
analysis indicates that the average per diem rates were $84 in 
1951-1952, $ll0 in 1956-1957, and $129 in 1962-1963, which is 
33 PROCEDURAL AND SUBSTANTIVE .ASPEcrs OF LABOR-MANAGEMENT ARBITRATION 12-13, 
19 (American Arb. Ass'n). 
34 Fleming, supra note I. 
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an increase of fifty-four percent over the period (which, inciden-
tally, he observes "is almost the same as the rise in average hourly 
earnings of production workers in manufacturing during the 
same period"). His analysis further shows that the average total 
fee per case was $277 in 1951-1952 and $402 in 1962-1963-an in-
crease of forty-five percent. . 
It is Fleming's over-all conclusion that even though arbitrators' 
fees have increased, they have not done so "to an inordinate de-
gree" in the type of case from which his sample was drawn, and 
that his data probably "fairly represent the arbitration picture to-
day . . . if one considers only those kinds of cases to which we 
have all grown accustomed over the years, e.g., discipline and 
discharge, seniority, job classification, etc." He suggests that "new 
and complex issues growing out of the emphasis upon job security 
may fall into quite a different pattern." 
There is little we can add on the question of the extent to 
which fees and total costs (attributable to the arbitrator) have 
been increasing beyond what can be inferred from the data re-
ported above. More information is needed. We understand FMCS 
is making a study of the matter. It is not doubted that there are 
some examples of excessive and extreme over-charging, but the 
evidence we have seen does not seem to sustain the claim that arbi-
trators' charges have increased alarmingly, or disproportionately 
as compared with the prices charged for other kinds of services or 
with other indices, such as the increase in the cost of living.85 
This conclusion, if justified, nevertheless may not be a com-
plete answer to the complaints about arbitrators' fees. Arbitration 
historically has had a "public service" aspect, and it may be that 
its increased professionalization, of which increased fees may be 
some evidence, has tended to indicate a change in the character of 
the arbitrator's function, as both he and the parties conceive it. 
The parties seem to expect increased competence and "expertise," 
based on experience with increasingly complex types of problems 
and, we think, expect more serious attention to the basic issues 
involved. Arbitrators may have justifiable reason, therefore, for 
thinking their services are worth more than in times past, and it 
85 In the first place, the increases in the average per diem rate and in the average 
total fee per case are not necessarily accurate reflections of the increase, if any, in average 
net income per case because overhead costs and other expenses of arbitrators, especially 
those maintaining their own offices, may have increased even more. It is of some interest 
that, according to one survey, 38.6% of the 1954 gross income of lawyers was expended 
for overhead. AMERICAN BAR Ass'N, ECONOl\UCS OF LAw PRACrICE SERIES, PAMPHLET No. 1, 
THE 1958 LAWYER AND HIS 1938 DoLI..AR 9. In view of the general upward trend in the 
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is understandable that they may have a tendency to compare their 
services, in terms of qualifications and income levels, with those of 
the recognized professions. 
Any such standard of evaluation of the fee problem-i.e., look-
ing at arbitration as a profession-probably would require the con-
clusion that arbitrators are not as a whole overpaid when compared 
with other professional groups; indeed, they may be underpaid. 
Moreover, again pursuing this analogy, if arbitrators are profes-
sional people, it can be expected that the usual variations exist in 
their competence, or at least in their reputation for competence, 
and that the clientele may be expected to pay more for the services 
of some arbitrators than for others. This would be true even for 
the so-called "routine" case. Arbitrators serving under some um-
pire systems with large corporations and large unions are much 
more highly compensated than are ad hoc arbitrators or those 
serving under some "lesser" umpire systems. This is some indica-
tion of acceptance of the concept that arbitration has become a 
true profession. 
We suggest, however, with some diffidence that the attempt 
price of commodities and services over the past decade, as may be seen below, overhead 
costs both for arbitrators and law practitioners certainly have increased. Thus, the per-
centage rise in net income of arbitrators may be less than Fleming's figures would suggesL 
AVERAGE GROSS AND NET RECEIPTS OF SOLO LA.WYERS, PHYSICIANS 
AND DENTISTS FOR PERIOD 1951-1960 
Lawyers 
Physicians 
Dentists 
Gross: 
Net: 
Gross: 
Net: 
Gross: 
Net: 
1951 
$8,011 
4,408 
18,235 
10,466 
12,902 
6,560 
1960 
$13,981 
7,257 
29,388 
17,183 
22,411 
11,511 
Increase 
Data for 1951 derived from U.S. TREAS. DEP'T, IRS PUB. No. 79, STATISTICS OF INCOME FOR 
1951 at 88 (1952). Data for 1960 derived from U.S. TREAS. DEP'T, IRS PUB. No. 453, STA• 
TISTICS OF INCOME FOR 1960-61 at 11 (1962). 
CONSUMER PRICE INDEX PERCENTAGE INCREASE-1953-1962 
(1957-1959 = 100) 
1953 1962 
All Items 93.2 105.4 
All Services 87.5 109.5 
Medical Care Services 83.0 116.8 
Transportation Services 85.2 111.2 
Hospital Rates 74.8 13D.4 
Increase 
13% 
25% 
40% 
31% 
74% 
Data derived from BUREAU LAB. STAT., BULL. No. 1351, PRICES: A CHARTBOOK, 1953-62 
tables A-1. A-59, A-60, A-84, A-86, A-87; BUREAU LAB. STAT., BULL. No. 1351-1 (Supp.), 
PRICES: A CHARTBOOK, 1953-62, table 1. 
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to analogize arbitrators to lawyers, physicians or other professional 
groups (a tendency we do not necessarily ascribe to most arbitra-
tors) may be unsound, and, indeed, that we may have used the 
term "professionalization" improperly in relation to the arbitra-
tion process. Arbitrators do, indeed, serve a "clientele," who pay 
for the services rendered, and we have no doubt that the services 
rendered call for many of the qualities of education, skill, and 
expertise which characterize the professions. But arbitrators are 
called upon to adjudicate disputes, not to act as counselors or ad-
visers. They serve not only the parties but also the public interest 
in peaceful industrial relations. Their work is the kind which is 
performed by judges in some other countries, and, indeed, would 
be performed in many instances by judges in this country if the 
parties were to discard voluntary, private arbitration. It may be 
more appropriate, therefore, to compare arbitrators with judges 
and others who render a high level public service rather than 
with lawyers and doctors in appraising the fee question and com-
paring income data. 
A final point to bear in mind is that the arbitrator's charges 
may well be (and we suspect ordinarily are) a minimal part of 
the total costs involved in processing a grievance or other case 
through arbitration. Employee, union, and man?gement investiga-
tion and preparatory time is involved, from beginning to end, and 
lawyers are frequently used. We do not mean to minimize the 
significance of the cost factor attributable to arbitrators, but we 
think in all fairness that the actual facts concerning trends in their 
charges, as well as other costs relating to the grievance and arbi-
tration process, should be developed and studied carefully before 
criticisms are made. It may be that some parties, especially small 
unions, need an arbitration forum which costs them little or 
nothing for the resolution of grievances. If so, the answer may lie 
in special statutory enactments. 
We assume, for purposes of this appraisal, the desirability of 
continuing our system of private arbitration. Perhaps the cost 
and some other elements inherent in the system warrant review of 
this assumption and consideration of the substitution of labor 
courts. But even within the general framework of private arbitra-
tion there are ways to meet the problem of costs in the case of 
parties who genuinely need relief. The arbitrators themselves 
could (and we suppose sometimes do) undertake such cases with-
out charge, or at reduced costs, and through local associations such 
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as the NAA regional groups could devise a procedure for deter-
mining the merits of taking and then of assigning cases on this 
basis. Alternatively, state or federal agencies could be authorized, 
as in some states, to provide such a service.36 
6. The Arbitrator-His Qualifications, Role, and 
Decision-Making Processes 
Almost without exception our respondents take the view that 
the arbitration process would be improved if arbitrators were more 
competent. The remark of one respondent, "The principal diffi-
culty which we now experience with the arbitration process lies 
with the arbitrator," and that of another who refers to the arbitra-
tor as "the weakest link in the chain," reflect the views of many. 
The basis for such reactions is not always explicated. Where 
stated, the range of views is interesting, to say the least, and reveals 
both emotionalism and cynicism, as well as judgments which are 
sober and reflective. Management representatives seem to be more 
critical than union representatives, which is perhaps understand-
able since they are usually on the "receiving" end of contract 
grievances. Some believe arbitration would be improved if arbi-
trators had more industrial experience and included fewer "social 
reformers," especially of the "academic" variety. Some are sus-
picious of all arbitrators for the reason indicated in the following 
expression from one of our respondents: 
"Arbitration is a business. If an arbitrator decides too 
many cases in favor of either party, he will be put out of 
36 Under Michigan law it is provided that" •.. the board [Labor Mediation Board] 
may, upon the request of the parties and the finding that the parties, or either of them, 
are unable to bear the expenses of the arbitration, designate an arbitrator for the dis• 
pute, in which event the expense of the arbitration, including a per diem fee of $50.00 
and necessary expenses of the arbitrator, shall be paid out of the general fund. • • ." 
MICH. STAT. ANN. § 17.454 (10.3)(2)(b) (1960). So far as we are aware, this provision has 
had little, if any, use. 
Under a recently adopted policy, announced by Richard E. Wanek, Minnesota State 
Labor Conciliator, he and members of his staff of conciliators have made themselves 
available to serve as arbitrators without cost to the parties. The policy, apparently, is 
to limit this service to instances of "small cases where the parties cannot afford the ex-
pense and services of arbitrators from private employment." Comment of Conciliator 
Wanek, 3 CCH LAB. L. REP., STATE LAws, 11 49514 (1963). 
The extensive arbitration services rendered in New York State by the State Board of 
Mediation are well known. This activity is unique in the quantity of free arbitration 
services provided. Wisconsin also has provided this kind of service under the supervision 
of the Wisconsin Employment Relations Board since 1939, and in 1961, for example, the 
service was utilized in 64 cases, most of them involving small employers. See Mueller, 
The Role of the Wisconsin Employment Board Arbitrator, 1963 WIS. L. R.Ev. 47. Inter-
estingly enough, a similar and active service is provided in Puerto Rico. Id. at 49. 
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business. This factor must affect an arbitrator's decision. I 
have heard arbitrators say otherwise. I am not convinced, any 
more than I am convinced that my third step answers are 
determined solely by whether or not there has been a contract 
violation." 
One of our respondents remarked, with considerable profundity, 
"If all arbitrators . . . could combine the best qualities of all 
the ones I have encountered, there would be little need to worry 
about improving the 'process' as an institution." The problem 
apparently is the universal one, common to all human institutions 
and endeavors, of seeking movement toward this kind of lofty 
goal. 
On one poi:µt of arbitration "practice"-whether the arbitra-
tor should act only as a judge and refrain from attempting media-
tion-our respondents indicate almost complete unanimity of 
view. They want a judge! And they tend to single out the univer-
sity professor as the kind of arbitrator most likely to essay a media-
tory role. This criticism is frequently associated with the view that 
arbitrators, in their decisions, too often "compromise," "split deci-
sions," and base decisions on other than proper contractual 
grounds.87 
The question whether the arbitrator should ever attempt to 
"mediate" in a case submitted to him for arbitration is one of 
long-standing controversy. Some distinguished and able men have 
debated this issue,88 and there is no need to review the arguments, 
87 One respondent states: "We do not look for mediation but we do look for a deci-
sion based upon the applicable terms of the contract. Arbitrators should confine them-
selves to the contract and leave Industrial Relations to some one else." 
88 An analysis of the essential differences in these roles is made by Sylvester Garret in 
The Role of Lawyers in Arbitration, ARBITRATION AND PUBLIC POLICY 102-24 (Pollard ed. 
1961). For expositions by proponents of the use of mediation, at least "when appropriate," 
see SIMKIN, ACCEPTABILITY AS A FAcrOR IN ARBITRATION UNDER AN EXISTING AGREEMENT 
61-63, 66-67 (1952); Gray, Nature and Scope of Arbitration and Arbitration Clauses, N.Y.U. 
1ST ANN. CONFERENCE ON LAB. 197, 199 (1948); Shulman, Reason, Contract, and Law in 
Labor Relations, 68 HARv. L. REV. 999, 1022-23 (1955); Symposium on Arbitration, 15 Lab . 
.Arb. 966, 968 (1951); Singer, Labor Arbitration: Should It Be Formal or Informal?, 2 LAB. 
L.J. 89, 91-93 (1951); Syme, Opinions and Awards, 15 Lab. Arb. 953, 954-55 (1951); Taylor, 
Effectuating the Labor Contract Through Arbitration, THE PROFESSION OF LABOR ARBITRA-
TION 20 (BNA 1957); Taylor, Further Remarks on Grievance Arbitration, 4 ARB. J. (n.s.) 92 
(1949); The Voluntary Arbitration of Labor Disputes, PROCEEDINGS, MICHIGAN LAw SCHOOL 
SUMMER INSTITUTE ON THE LAW AND LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS 191 (1950). 
For expressions of doubt or opposition, see DAVEY, CONTEMPORARY CoLI.EcrIVE BAR-
GAINING ch. 12 (1951); Kfil.LOR, AMERICAN ARBITRATION 84-85 (1948), cited and quoted in 
4 ARB. J. (n.s.) 182, 184 (1949); MORSE, THE JUDICIAL THEORY OF ARBITRATION IN UNIONS, 
MANAGEMENT AND THE PUBLIC 489 (Bakke &: Kerr ed. 1948); UPDEGRAFF &: McCoy, .ARBI-
TRATION OF LABOR DISPUTES 203, 204 n.19 (BNA 1961); Bailer, Arbitration Procedure and 
Practice: Arbitrator P'iewpoint, N.Y.U. 15TH ANN. CONFERENCE ON LAB. 349 (1962); Braden, 
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which are well known. Our contribution on this subject consists 
principally of our report of current feeling as expressed by our 
respondents. We would add only our own belief that, especially 
in view of the parties' expectations, the presumption should be 
against mediation efforts, but we are sure there are instances in 
which mediation can and should be undertaken, especially where 
there is some indication from the parties (which may have to be 
read into their approach to the case) that mediation would be 
welcomed. We know there have been situations in which sophisti-
cated and experienced arbitrators have successfully undertaken 
mediation, even in ad hoc arbitration. 
The charge that arbitrators tend to compromise and to split 
decisions because of the problem of acceptability is one that should 
be met and appraised. The pat answer from the arbitration frater-
nity is simply a flat denial. Indeed, the arbitrator is likely to say 
that to split decisions consciously is the best and surest way to 
lose acceptability, presumably because, ultimately, "the truth will 
out," and the parties will come to realize that they cannot be sure 
that a case will be approached on its merits. We share this general 
view (naturally), and we doubt that any arbitrator will publicly 
declare otherwise. All arbitrators will say that they call the shots 
The Function of the Arbitrator in ·Labor-Management Disputes, 4 ARB. J. (n.s.) !15 (1949); 
Davey, The John Deere-UAW Permanent Arbitration System, CRITICAL ISSUES IN LAllOR 
ARBITRATION 161, 162, 185 (BNA 1957); Davey, Labor Arbitration: A Current Appraisal, 
9 IND. & LAB. REL. REV. 85 (1955-56); Davey, The Proper Uses of Arbitration, 9 LAB. L.J. 
119 (1958); Davey, Hazards in Labor Arbitration, I IND. & LAB. REL. REv. !186 (1947-48); 
Fuller, Collective Bargaining and the Arbitrator, 196!1 Wis. L. REv. ll (196!1); Gellhorn, 
Symposium on Arbitration, 15 Lab. Arb. 966, 969 (1951); Iserman, The Arbitrator in 
Grievance Procedures: Is Arbitration the Way To Settle Labor Disputes?, !15 A.B.A.J. 987, 
990 (1949); Johnson, Contrasts in the Role of the Arbitrator and of the Mediator, 9 LAD. 
L.J. 769, 772 (1958); Livingston, Arbitration: Evaluation of Its Role in Labor Relations, 
N.Y.U. 12TH ANN. CONFERENCE ON LAB. 109, 119 (1959); McCoy, Symposium on Arbitration, 
15 Lab. Arb. 966,968 (1951); Merrill, A Labor Arbitrator Views His Work, IO VAND. L. REv. 
789 (1957); Miller, Comments on the Doctrine of Acceptability of Labor Arbitration 
Awards: Mediation vs. Arbitration, 4 ARB. J. (n.s.) 182 (1949); O'Connell, Arbitration Proce-
dure and Practice: Management Viewpoint, N.Y.U. 15TH ANN. CONFERENCE ON LAn. lllll, 
3!12-34 (1962); Segal, Arbitration: A Union Viewpoint, THE ARBITRATOR AND THE PARTIES 
47, 55-56 (BNA 1958); Trotta, Discussion-Arbitration: A Management Viewpoint, THE 
ARBITRATOR AND THE PARTIES 76, 89-91 (BNA 1958). 
See also BRAUN, LABOR DISPUTES AND THEIR SETTLEMENT 150, 202 n.6!1 (rev. ed. 1955); 
Ferguson, Cooper & Horvitz, An Appraisal of Labor Arbitration, 8 IND, & LAB. REL. REv. 
79 (1954-55); Platt, Current Criticisms of Labor Arbitration, ARBITRATION AND THE LAw vii 
(BNA 1959); Survey conducted by Yale Law School, Labor Law Section of Conn. Bar 
Ass'n, AAA and L-M Center of Yale University in 1951, 6 ARB. J. (n.s.) 70, 7!1 (1951); 
Warren & Bernstein, A Profile of Labor Arbitration, 16 Lab. Arb. 970, 981-82 (1951). 
It is of some interest to note that the 1962 survey made by the National Academy of 
Arbitrators reveals that 156 arbitrators responding to the questionnaire on this issue 
indicated that they attempted mediation in 323 cases (5.1 % of the total caseload handled), 
and were successful in 171 of such cases for a "batting" average of 52.9%, See note 29 supra. 
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as they see them, and that if this means that twenty cases on a 
docket come out for one side or the other, so be it. In the belief 
that arbitrators do tend to split decisions, some parties, especially 
on the management side, consider it preferable to arbitrate only 
one issue at a time, and to insist upon a different arbitrator for each 
case. This approach may avoid the problem, if there be one, of 
split decisions, but it also greatly increases the cost of arbitration. 
We believe most arbitrators are honest in their expression 
that they look at their cases "one at a time." We must admit, 
however, that these declarations are self-serving, and we know of 
no easy or reliable way to test the merits of the charge made against 
the arbitrators, or their answer. We would like to see a serious 
attempt made to research the matter. Without doubting for a 
moment the sincerity of arbitrators as a whole, we must concede 
the possibility that there may be some subconscious, psychological 
factor present in their mental processes, deriving from the prob-
lem of "acceptability," which would not be present if, for exam-
ple, they had the tenure of federal judges. 
To proceed to another point, there appears from our survey 
to be general agreement that the arbitrator should base his deci-
sion "on the contract," but it is not clear just what is meant by this 
general precept. Some say that the literal language of the agree-
ment should be controlling; others say the problem is to determine 
"the intent of the parties," and take the view that the contract 
language is not always reliable in indicating such intent. We find 
among our respondents a preponderant view (perhaps because a 
preponderance of our replies are from the management side) that 
the arbitrator should disregard past practice and considerations of 
equity. Frankly, we find little that is useful or constructive in 
these generalizations. The determination of the intent of the par-
ties on an issue of contract interpretation is frequently a thorny 
problem; otherwise, the case might not be before the arbitrator. 
An appraisal of this process is beyond the scope of this review. 
We find among our replies, sometimes even from the same re-
spondents, the complaint on the one hand that arbitrators often 
do not answer fully and directly the arguments made by the par-
ties, and on the other hand that arbitration opinions tend to be 
too lengthy. There is some inconsistency here, although there are 
instances in which the undue length of opinions is attributed to 
an attempt to soften the blow by giving the "decision" to one side 
and the "opinion" to the other, or to attempt to "opine" too 
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broadly and thus, as one remarked, "to muddy up the decision 
and create new grounds for grievances." Some think there are few 
decisions which could not, with profit to all concerned, be reduced 
in length by at least fifty percent. 
We simply report these complaints without attempting to as-
sess their general validity. There is little doubt that some opinions 
are unduly prolix, insufficiently responsive to the precise claims 
presented, and, like some of our more notable Supreme Court 
opinions, liberally laced with "dicta" which may represent pro-
found wisdom but not a kind of professional service which the 
parties have sought or desire. It is our impression that the more 
seasoned the arbitrator, the less guilty he is of these transgressions. 
It is also our impression that there are occasions when the "full" 
opinion is not only desired by the parties, but helpful. There are 
controls which are available to the parties. They can indicate the 
kind of opinion they want, or even agree to eliminate opinions 
altogether, and simply take the "award." They can also agree 
upon a "short form" summary opinion as adequate for particular 
cases.89 
Our respondents, particularly from the management side, in-
dicate that there is rather considerable support for the proposition 
that arbitrators should make greater use of "precedent" in decid-
ing cases. The younger arbitrators, it is suggested, should pay 
more heed to the decisions of their older and more experienced 
brethren in order to reduce the likelihood of error. The point 
most frequently made, however, is that there should be greater 
use of precedent in order to increase "predictability." One man-
agement attorney remarked: 
"The only matter of any substantial nature which I find 
undesirable in the arbitration process is the absence of a basis 
to advise companies with respect to contemplated action in 
accordance with what arbitrators have done in similar cases. 
I am afraid that a few arbitrators are over-anxious in their 
desire to show that they are not bound by stare decisis." 
This is likewise a subject of long-standing controversy. Opinion 
among academic "experts," arbitrators, and partisan representa-
tives runs the gamut.40 There are those who believe that the use 
39 See Seitz, An Open Letter to a Union Attorney, 17 ARB. J. (n.s.) 67 (1962). This 
article contains an excellent discussion of why arbitrators in general believe it necessary 
to explain fully their awards. 
40 On this subject see ELKOURI 8: ELKOURI, How .ARl!rrn.ATION WoRKS 243 (rev. ed. 
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of precedent should be eliminated altogether, and that a disservice 
is being performed even by the publication of awards. Proponents 
of this view feel that an arbitrator is employed by the parties to 
focus his attention exclusively on the case presented to him, and 
that this ought to mean that he should not dilute the purity of his 
mental processes through exposure to the views of others who ap-
pear to have met similar problems. Advocates of this position like-
wise deplore the development of a case law of "industrial jurispru-
dence" as introducing improper rigidities into the area of contract 
interpretation. 
Probably the middle view, on the whole, has the most wide-
spread support. This view holds that, while precedent should not 
be considered binding, and while cases typically are never on all 
fours with others, there is educational value in published opinions, 
and there is no reason why the product of the thought of other ar-
bitrators and, indeed, the summaries of positions taken by other 
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tional Procedure, 4 ARB. J. (n.s.) 248, 251 (1949): Cherne, Should Arbitration Awards Be 
Published?, l ARB. J. (n.s.) 75 (1946): Davey, The John Deere-UAW Permanent Arbitration 
System, CRITICAL ISSUES IN LABOR ARBITRATION 161, 174 (BNA 1957): Davey, Labor Arbitra-
tion: A Current Appraisal, 9 IND. &: LAB. REL. REv. 85 (1955-56); Editorial, Creeping 
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Reporting of Labor Arbitration: Pro and Con, l ARB. J. (n.s.) 420, 423 (1946); Killings-
worth, Arbitration: Its Uses in Industrial Relations, 21 Lab. Arb. 859, 861-63 (1954); Leven-
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Arbitration: Evaluation of its Role in Labor Relations, N.Y.U. 12TH ANN. CONFERENCE 
ON LAB. 281, 284, 288-89 (1959); Platt, Current Criticisms of Labor Arbitration, ARBITRA-
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parties, should not be available for consideration, subject always to 
the qualification, which every experienced arbitrator understands, 
that it is his judgment that is expected by the parties. We sub-
scribe to this view, and in any event we think it inevitable that 
this will be the continuing course of development. 
One of the major problems, however, in connection with the 
use of published arbitration awards by arbitrators, parties, and 
students of labor relations arises out of the limitations in the proc-
ess of publication, as presently practiced. Unlike the awards of 
appellate courts, all or most of which are systematically published, 
the publication of arbitration awards is a private procedure with 
limited publication (as, for example, in the case of the General 
Motors-UAW Umpire decisions), or publication by private pub-
lishing houses on a selective basis of awards submitted to them. 
The total of all published awards is a very small percentage of all 
the decisions rendered, and there is no assurance that what is pub-
lished represents a proper sampling of all the decisions rendered 
in particular subject areas, or even a proper sampling of those sub-
mitted for publication. What, if anything, can be done to improve 
this situation we do not know. Possibly the various publishing 
houses, the appointing agencies and the National Academy of Ar-
bitrators should establish some procedures for joint discussion of 
the problem. 
The matter of precedent within a given employer-union con-
tract relationship obviously presents special problems. Here there 
is much to be said for respecting prior decisions, especially if the 
parties have not repudiated them by making changes in pertinent 
contract language. In this context the argument for predictability 
is compelling. Substantial consistency in the treatment of prob-
lems of contract application probably accords with the expecta-
tions of the parties, at least under umpire systems, and contributes 
to the stability of the relationship. This is not to say that an um-
pire should not "overrule" a previous interpretation which he 
considers palpably wrong. It is simply to say that he should do 
so only after the most serious deliberation. 
7. Responsibilities of the Parties 
Our respondents concede that the arbitration process would 
be improved by more adequate screening of cases, so that only 
cases presenting bona fide issues go to arbitration. This kind of 
observation is so obviously correct as to be trite. Experience under 
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some of the major umpire systems, such as General Motors, Ford 
and International Harvester, show that startling results in this di-
rection can be achieved. Adequate and responsible screening, 
however, is doubtless politically impossible within some unions, 
and may now be complicated by an increased reluctance on the 
part of some union leaders, due to fears of legal liability, to step 
up to their responsibilities. Nevertheless, as one of our respondents 
comments, it makes little sense to pass the responsibility on to an 
arbitrator to make a decision that should have been made by the 
parties, especially if he is then irresponsibly denounced by the 
irresponsible party for making a "poor" decision. 
C. CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS 
It is interesting to note the general tenor of the current ap-
praisals of the arbitration process as revealed by our survey. Em-
phasis appears to be centered on "legal" and procedural matters, 
although, interestingly enough, only one of our respondents sug-
gests that only lawyers should be arbitrators. This emphasis is 
likewise reflected in the subject matter considered at the annual 
meetings of the National Academy of Arbitrators, and in much 
of the research and writing on arbitration in recent years. Many 
of the problems which now concern arbitrators and the parties are 
not those which troubled "Billy" Lieserson and Harry Shulman, 
or for that matter, even now trouble George Taylor. 
Yet it remains the fact that many people still want arbitration 
to remain the informal, inexpensive, expeditious problem-solving 
process which, perhaps, was its chief claim for support in the past. 
It probably can still be that if the parties wish it that way. Our 
guess, however, is that for a variety of reasons, including recent 
legal developments, the professionalization of the arbitrator and 
the increased use of attorneys, the trend will be in the direction 
of greater emphasis upon the quasi-judicial role of the arbitrator, 
and upon related matters which will make the process more palat-
able in the light of the present state of the law concerning the 
finality of the arbitrator's determination. 
APPENDIX 
The standard form of "Individual Arbitration Agreement," suggested for use at the 
local level, contains the following provisions: 
"Section 1. In the event of any difference arising between the parties to this con-
tract which cannot be adjusted by conciliation, such difference shall be submitted to 
arbitration under the Code of Procedure provided by the International Arbitration 
Agreement, effective January I, 1963, between the American Newspaper Publishers 
1154 MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 62 
Association and the International Printing Pressmen and Assistants' Union of North 
America. 
"Section 2. This contract shall cover any contract between the parties of the first 
and second parts whether the same is in writing or an oral understanding, subject to 
the conditions expressed in the International Arbitration Agreement, effective January 
1, 1963, between the American Newspaper Publishers Association and the Inter-
national Printing Pressmen and Assistants' Union of North America. 
"Section 3. It is expressly understood and agreed that the International Arbitra-
tion Agreement and the Code of Procedure, both hereunto attached, between the 
American Newspaper Publishers Association and the International Printing Pressman 
and Assistants' Union of North America shall be integral parts of this contract and 
shall have the same force and effect as though set forth in the contract itself. 
"Section 4. The parties hereto specifically authorize the Board of Directors of the 
International Printing Pressmen and Assistants' Union of North America and the 
Special Standing Committee of the American Newspaper Publishers Association to 
give public disavowal to any failure to comply with this contract as provided in 
Section 13 of the International Arbitration Agreement." 
The "International Arbitration Agreement" between the ANPA and the International 
Pressmens' Union provides, among other things, as follows: 
"Section 3. Any publisher, who holds an Individual Arbitration Contract under 
the prior Agreement between the parties hereto which terminated December 31, 1962, 
and whose Individual Arbitration Contract does not provide for continuation beyond 
December 31, 1962, shall be protected hereunder, if, before March I, 1963, he shall 
have secured an Individual Arbitration Contract in accordance with the provisions 
of this Agreement. 
"In like manner the union and members thereof shall be protected against lock-
outs or any other concerted action to discriminate against members of the union 
upon the part of the publishers, provided said union or members thereof have com-
plied with the terms of the Agreement. 
"Section 4. Subject to the conditions specified in Section 2 every member of the 
American Newspaper Publishers Association shall have the following guaranties: 
"(a) He shall be protected against walkouts, strikes, boycotts or any action by 
members of the union or unions with which he has contractual relations under this 
Agreement (such as unauthorized vacations, or individual resignations) which shall 
tend to delay publication, and against any other form of concerted interference by 
them with the normal and regular operation of any of his departments of labor. 
"(b) In the event of a difference arising between a publisher having an arbitra• 
tion contract or argeement and any local union a party thereto, all work shall con-
tinue without interruption pending proceedings looking to conciliation or arbitration, 
either local or international, and the scale and hours provided in contract between 
the parties and working conditions prevailing prior to the time the differences arose 
shall be preserved unchanged until a final decision of the matter at issue shall have 
been reached. 
"(c) All differences which cannot be settled by conciliation shall be referred to 
arbitration in the manner stipulated in this Agreement. This sub-section is hereby 
construed to contemplate the submission to arbitration of all questions which involve 
the cost, working conditions, efficiency and administration of the services of members 
of the I. P. P. & A. U., in the operation of the newspaper press rooms but not to 
include such matters as have to do solely with the internal laws of the I. P. P. & A. U. 
relating to its self-government. 
"(d) Except as set forth in Section 8, it shall be competent on 10 days' notice in 
any local or international arbitration bearing for either side to raise the point that 
certain matters are not properly arbitrable and if the other side denies the claims, 
the question raised as to the arbitrability of an issue shall first be determined by the 
International Arbitration Board before any evidence is beard as to the merits of the 
issue claimed not to be arbitrable. 
"Section 5. (a) It is agreed that the procedures herein provided for settling 
disputes by local and international arbitration of issues shall be used to the exclusion 
of any other means available to the parties who sigu this Agreement under which 
all decisions are final and binding on both parties. Any rights or remedies otherwise 
available to the parties to this Agreement are hereby expressly waived. . 
"(b) It is also agreed that the procedures for the remedy of grievances and settle-
ment of disputes provided herein are to be applied promptly. In the event either 
party fails to act promptly to bring a dispute to a bearing or refuses to appear at any 
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proceeding conducted under this Agreement, then the provisions of Section 5, sub-
section 11 of the Code of Procedure shall apply. 
"Section 6. All differences arising under an existing written contract, or an oral 
understanding, which involve the application of the International Arbitration Agree-
ment as specified in Section 2, the Code of Procedure, or any clause or clauses in 
contracts, or the interpretation to be placed upon any part or parts of any agree-
ments, which cannot be settled by conciliation, shall be referred to local arbitration 
if so required by the local contracts, but if not, shall be submitted to the chairman 
of the Special Standing Committee of the American Newspaper Publishers Associa-
tion and the president of the International Printing Pressmen and Assistants' Union 
of North America, together with the arguments and briefs of both parties, and an 
agreed statement of facts in the controversy, accompanied by a joint letter of trans-
mission, certifying that each party is familiar with the contents of all documents. 
In case these two officials cannot reach a decision upon the issues involved, their 
differences shall be submitted to the International Board of Arbitration. 
"Section 7. All differences other than those specified in Section 6 of this Agree-
ment, including disagreements arising in negotiations for a new scale of wages, or 
for hours of labor, or in renewing or extending an existing scale, or in respect to a 
contract, which cannot be settled by conciliation, shall be referred to a local board 
of arbitration in the manner stipulated in the Code of Procedure as set forth in 
Exhibit 'B'. But the International Board of Arbitration may, in its discretion, 
assume jurisdiction over any dispute that is jointly submitted by the local parties 
signatory to this Individual Arbitration Agreement. 
"Section 8. The question whether a department shall be union or non-union 
shall not be classed as a "difference" to be arbitrated. A department shall be inter-
preted to mean the entire press room and not any portions of this department. 
Union departments shall be understood to mean such as are made up of union 
employes and in which the union has been formally recognized by the employer. 
"Section 9. If either party to a local arbitration shall be dissatisfied with a deci-
sion by a local board, appeal may be taken to the International Board of Arbitration 
to be constituted as hereinafter provided. Such appeal may also be taken to the 
International Board by either party if for any cause a decision shall not have been 
rendered by a local board within ninety days after the questions to be arbitrated 
have been duly determined under the Code of Procedure. 
"Section 13. At the request of either party to an arbitration the International 
Board shall determine whether evasion, collusion or fraud has characterized either 
the local or international proceedings, or whether either patty has failed to comply 
with, or refuses to fulfill its obligations under a decision, or has omitted to perform 
any duty prescribed therein, or has secured any unfair or fraudulent advantage, or 
has evaded any provision of this Agreement or any rule of the Code of Procedure, 
or is not acting in good faith. At the conclusion of such inquiry it shall be wholly 
within the power of the International Board to reject all that has been previously 
done and order a rehearing before the International Board, or before a new local 
board; or it may find against the offending party or annul the Individual Arbitration 
Contract. In the event of either party to a dispute refusing to accept and comply 
with a decision of a local board which is not appealed, or with a decision of the 
International Board, or with any of the provisions of this International Arbitration 
Agreement, as determined by a decision of the International Board all aid and support 
to the employer or the local union refusing acceptance and compliance shall be 
withdrawn by both parties to this Agreement. The acts of such recalcitrant employer 
or union shall be publicly disavowed and the aggrieved party shall be furnished by 
the other with an official document to that effect, signed by the Board of Directors 
of the International Printing Pressmen and Assistants' Union of North America and 
the Special Standing Committee of the American Newspaper Publishers Association." 
Section 9 of the International Agreement, it will be noted, provides for an "appeal" 
of a local arbitration decision. Of interest, also, is the breadth of the arbitration pro-
visions, Apparently, under section 7 of the International Agreement even disputes over 
the terms of a new agreement are arbitrable. 
The "Code of Procedure" prescribed for local arbitration is quite detailed. With 
respect to appeals to the International Board, it provides: 
"Section 9. When either party to a local arbitration shall desire to appeal to the 
International Board, written notice to that effect must be given to the other party 
(specifying the points on which it wishes to base its appeal), within five (5) days 
after the local decision has been rendered, and the appeal shall be filed with the 
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International Board within thirty (30) days after such decision. When an appeal is 
under consideration by the International Board of Arbitration it shall not take evi-
dence, but both parties to the controversy may appear personally or may submit the 
records and briefs of the local hearing and make oral or written arguments in support 
of their several contentions. Each party shall submit eight copies of any brief for 
appeal that he may desire to present for consideration of the International Board. 
They may submit an agreed statement of facts, or a transcript of testimony, properly 
certified to before a notary public by the stenographer taking the original evidence 
or depositions. They may agree in advance not to appear personally at such hearing 
on an appeal." 
